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Foreword 
 
 
As part of its efforts to strengthen good governance and therefore promote 
government accountability and transparency, the World Bank Institute’s Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Reform division (WBIPR) has organized in collaboration 
with the Research Committee of legislative specialists, a roundtable on “The role of 
Parliaments in the Budget Process” at the Southern Political Science Association 
Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, USA, January 5-9, 2005.  The panel was chaired 
by David M. Olson (Professor Emeritus, University of North Carolina at Greensboro) 
and Rick Stapenhurst (Senior Public Sector Specialist at the WBIPR). The papers 
presented hereafter are the product of that roundtable. 
 
In the first paper Joachim Wehner examines data from 43 countries to explain the 
different institutional arrangements to oversee the budget process. He argues that what 
determines the division of labor between the legislative and executive branch is not 
the presidential or parliamentarian mode of government, but the access to 
information, federalist structures and constitutional provisions affected by colonial 
rule.  
 
Zdenka Mansfeldová and Petra Rakušanová analyse the bargaining process in the 
legislature of the Czech Republic. Indeed over recent years, the budget process has 
undergone some great changes. Although the distribution of party-power in the 
Parliament and the Budget Committee remains of crucial importance, joining the 
European Union has led Parliament to seek a greater profile and strengthen its 
auditing functions, and professionalisation of the deputies on the Budgets Committee, 
has greatly increased the Committee’s influence and prestige. 
 
Carolyn Forestiere’s and Riccardo Pelizzo’s paper studies the role of the Italian 
parliament to examine how institutional and political conditions influence the 
legislative power over the budget. Drawing on institutional and party system theories, 
they argue that procedures and ideology provide the greatest incentives for 
parliaments to deviate from unilaterally supporting their governments during the 
passage of the national budget.  
 
Finally Barry Anderson’s paper discusses the potential value of independent 
analytical budget units for the legislature in increasing the transparency, credibility 
and accountability of the budget process. After examining a couple of country specific 
cases, he comes to the conclusion that for them to successfully fulfil a set of core 
functions, such units need to be at least non-partisan, independent, and objective.  
 
The views expressed herein are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the World Bank Institute. 
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Acting Manager 
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Legislative arrangements for financial scrutiny: 
 
Explaining cross-national variation 
 
Joachim Wehner∗
 
 
 
This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and 
effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate 
representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and 
for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.1
 
 
The legislative ‘power of the purse’ is said to be fundamentally important for 
democratic government. Yet, even a cursory comparison of legislative arrangements 
for financial scrutiny has to conclude that legislatures differ widely in the way with 
which they exercise the ‘power over the purse’. The US Congress has broad 
constitutional powers in financial matters, makes budgetary decisions through a 
complex system of specialized committees in both houses, and has access to extensive 
analytical support in the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).2 The UK Parliament, 
by contrast, has abdicated the right to financial initiative to the executive,3 does not 
have a specialized budget committee, and has no parliamentary budget office to 
provide analytical support. Given that the authorization of taxes and public 
expenditures is a primary function of the legislature in any democratic system, such 
an amount of variation among modern democracies is perplexing. Why do some 
legislatures have elaborate institutional arrangements for financial scrutiny while 
others essentially leave budget-making to the executive? 
 
Recent decades have seen much progress in the comparative study of legislative 
structures, including for example parliamentary committees and bicameralism.4 
                                                 
∗ Thanks to Bernard Casey, Patrick Dunleavy, Achim Goerres and participants of the 2005 Southern 
Political Science Association Conference for useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as 
to Mario Arriagada for assistance with accessing material on the Mexican Congress. The usual caveat 
applies. 
1 Publius, The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 359. 
2 Definitions of the budget differ across countries. It appears that the first traceable legal definition is 
contained in a French decree of 1862: ‘The budget is a document which forecasts and authorizes the 
annual receipts and expenditures of the State…’ Cited in R. Stourm, The Budget (New York: D. 
Appleton for the Institute for Government Research, 1917), p. 2. The use of the word in the UK now 
refers to the Spring Financial Statement, which focuses on taxation measures. In most countries, 
however, the term refers to the annual expenditure and revenue plans tabled in the legislature. I use the 
word in this broader sense. 
3 In 1706 the Commons resolved ‘That this House will receive no Petition for any sum of Money 
relating to public Service, but what is recommended from the Crown.’ Quoted in G. Reid, The Politics 
of Financial Control: The Role of the House of Commons (London: Hutchinson University Library, 
1966), p. 36. 
4 Some examples are: H. Döring, ed., Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt: 
Campus, 1995). D.M. Olson, Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1994). P. Norton, ed., Parliaments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1990). Inter-
Parliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium (Aldershot: 
Despite its fundamental importance, however, legislative budgeting remains a 
neglected area in comparative research. Much of the qualitative literature on the 
budgetary role of the legislature has focused on a relatively modest number of cases.5 
One danger with this approach is that a few cases are used to generalize findings. For 
example, a comparison between the US Congress and the UK Parliament might be 
used to infer that legislative control of budgets is most developed in presidential 
systems of government. More quantitative and larger N studies of budget institutions, 
on the other hand, tend to focus on only a small number of institutional features that 
are relevant to understanding the legislature’s budgetary role, such as powers of 
amendment.6
 
This paper adds to the growing body of comparative research on legislative structures 
and fiscal institutions. I use a new and comprehensive survey of institutional 
arrangements for legislative budgeting across 43 national legislatures, several of 
which have not been studied extensively to date, to explore why these arrangements 
differ substantially. The paper proceeds in four main steps. The legislative budgeting 
database is briefly introduced in section one. Section two discusses several possible 
explanatory variables. Based on the results of multiple OLS regression analysis 
presented in section three, the fourth section considers broader implications for 
comparative research. 
 
Mapping the differences 
 
The legislative budgeting database contains data for 43 countries on 15 institutional 
variables relating to legislative scrutiny of the budget. The dataset is based on the 
2003 Survey of Budget Practices and Procedures carried out by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development in cooperation with the World Bank,7 and 
incorporates complementary data from constitutions and parliamentary websites. This 
database covers three aspects, i.e. the budgetary powers of the legislature, legislative 
organization, and the legislature’s access to budgetary information. Each covers a 
number of variables that have been aggregated into indices. The three indices can be 
understood as capturing sets of necessary institutional conditions for effective 
legislative control of the budget. The following paragraphs briefly discuss these 
indices. A detailed overview of the legislative budgeting dataset and index 
                                                                                                                                            
Gower, 1986). M.L. Mezey, Comparative Legislatures (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979). On 
committees: D.G. McGee, The Overseers: Public Accounts Committees and Public Spending (London: 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and Pluto Press, 2002). L.D. Longley and R.H. Davidson, 
eds., The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees (London: Frank Cass, 1998).On bicameralism: S.C. 
Patterson and A. Mughan, eds., Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 1999). G. Tsebelis and J. Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
5 D.L. Coombes, ed., The Power of the Purse: The Role of European Parliaments in Budgetary 
Decisions (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976). D.M. Olson and M.L. Mezey, eds., Legislatures 
in the Policy Process: The Dilemmas of Economic Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991). A. Schick, ‘Can National Legislatures Regain an Effective Voice in Budget Policy?’ OECD 
Journal on Budgeting 1:3 (2002), 15-42. 
6 Examples are: J. von Hagen, Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European 
Communities (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs, 1992). M. Hallerberg and P. Marier, ‘Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, 
and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries,’ American Journal of Political 
Science 48:3 (2004), pp. 571-87. 
7 The survey results are available online at http://ocde.dyndns.org/ [last accessed 13 December 2004]. 
construction is provided elsewhere (Wehner, 2005). Country scores can be found in 
the appendix, which also contains the data for the independent variables. 
 
The budgetary powers index reflects the extent to which a legislature has formal 
budgetary decision-making authority. It captures budget amendment rules, the nature 
of the reversionary budget, executive veto powers, budgetary bicameralism, and 
executive discretion to impound and reallocate funds during budget execution. The 
highest possible score of 100 means that the legislature has unfettered powers to 
amend the budget, the legislature explicitly approves any interim spending measures 
in case of delayed approval of the main budget, the executive has no package or line 
item veto for financial legislation, the legislature consists of two chambers with co-
equal powers in budgeting, and impoundment and virement without legislative 
approval are severely restricted. The US Congress would have a perfect score on this 
index were it not for the presidential package veto. Several other legislatures get high 
scores, in particular those of Sweden, Norway, Hungary, the Netherlands and Japan. 
At the bottom end of this index are the Irish, French and Jordanian parliaments, all of 
which have relatively constrained budgetary powers. 
 
The legislative organization index is a measure of the complexity of the internal 
infrastructure for financial scrutiny. It considers the extent to which legislatures use 
budget, sect oral and audit committees for financial scrutiny, as well as the amount of 
time available for approval of the draft budget and whether the legislature has a two-
step decision-making procedure that fixes aggregates before specific allocations are 
decided.8 A score of 100 means that the legislature has an extensive role for 
committees in budget approval as well as audit scrutiny, has more than six months to 
scrutinize the draft budget, and uses the two-stage decision-making process. The US 
Congress has the highest possible score on this index. There is a substantial gap 
between the US Congress and the next group of parliaments, which includes those of 
Sweden, Norway, Hungary, France and the Czech Republic. At the bottom end of the 
scale are the National Assembly of Jordan and the UK Parliament. 
 
The information index captures the extent to which the legislature has access to 
budgetary information, with variables on the quality of budget documentation 
submitted by the executive, the timeliness and quality of audit information, and 
legislative access to budget research capacity. A score of 100 means that the budget 
documentation was rated as broadly in line with the OECD’s Best Practices for 
Budget Transparency (OECD, 2002) in an expert survey, audited annual accounts are 
submitted to the legislature within six months after the end of the fiscal year, the 
supreme audit institution carries out performance audits in addition to financial audits, 
and the legislature has a substantial budget research office. The variation between 
different legislatures is most extreme on this index compared with the previous two 
indices. The US Congress has the highest possible score, followed by Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Canada. At the bottom end of the ranking, the Bolivian National 
Congress gets a score of zero for budgetary information access, and the legislatures of 
Cambodia, Suriname and Nigeria score extremely poorly as well. 
                                                 
8 An example of the two-step process is discussed in J.R. Blöndal, ‘Budgeting in Sweden.’ OECD 
Journal on Budgeting 1:1 (2001), pp. 27-57. The Swedish Parliament fixes the aggregate level of 
expenditures and revenues in a Spring Fiscal Policy Bill tabled in April. Following the introduction of 
the budget in September the debate focuses on the allocation of the approved spending total between 
and within 27 ‘expenditure areas’, such as justice, defense, energy etc. 
 
In addition, the composite index of legislative budgeting (also referred to in this paper 
as the total index) is calculated by averaging each legislature’s scores on the three 
component indices. This assumes that each of the three components is equally 
important for legislative control of public finance. Only the US Congress gets a very 
high score to the composite index, followed by the Swedish and Norwegian 
parliaments. Eight national legislatures fall short of a total index score of 40. These 
data highlight the vast amount of overall variation in legislative arrangements for 
financial scrutiny. Moreover, the contribution of each component index score to the 
total index score varies substantially between cases. Only a few legislatures, in 
particular the US Congress as well as the Swedish Riksdag and the Norwegian 
Storting get consistently high scores on all of the component indices. Many 
legislatures differ substantially in their scores across the component indices. The 
Canadian Parliament, for instance, gets a high score for information access, but lower 
scores for legislative organization and budgetary powers. The General Assembly of 
Uruguay, on the other hand, gets a relatively high score for budgetary powers, but 
scores poorly on the other component indices. In short, there is substantial variation in 
total scores as well as in the composition of total scores. 
 
The within-case variation across the component indices suggests that we cannot 
expect a single set of factors to account uniformly for these differences, but rather that 
the three aspects of legislative budgeting are influenced by distinct independent 
variables. Table 1 confirms that the three component indices capture distinct and 
independent dimensions of legislative financial scrutiny. The correlation coefficients 
between the component indices are positive but small in particular once the upper 
outlier of the US Congress is excluded from the sample. 
 
Table 1: Pearson's coefficients among the component indices 
 Total sample (N = 43) Excluding US Congress (N = 42) 
 Powers Organization Information Powers Organization Information 
Powers 1   1   
Organization .372 1  .243 1  
Information .257 .273 1 .183 .156 1 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
The following paragraphs briefly review four sets of plausible explanatory variables 
and their measurement. These consider the possibility that the institutional differences 
described in section one are due to institutional replication, other features of the 
political system, in particular the separation of powers and what may be called the 
separation of purpose, as well as the broader development context of a country. 
 
Institutional replication. Cross-country differences may be due to institutional 
replication. One cause of such replication is the transfer of institutional features from 
a colonial power to its colonies. For instance, Lienert found significant differences 
between public expenditure management systems in anglophone and francophone 
African countries, in particular with regard to budget execution and government 
accounting (Lienert, 2003). Other comparative work has shown that the Westminster 
Parliament in particular is characterized by a high level of executive dominance 
(Siaroff 2003a). The sample contains several former UK colonies, so I construct a 
dummy variable for these countries, which is expected to have a negative effect on 
legislative scrutiny. I only include former colonies with independence in the past 150 
years because the institutional contours of legislative financial scrutiny in the UK 
were undergoing significant adjustments until at least the Gladstonian reforms in the 
1860s (Einzig, 1959). The number of former French colonies in the sample is not 
sufficiently large to construct a similar variable, and Spain lost the bulk of her 
colonies before the 150-year cut-off point. 
 
Separation of power. A second proposition is that the role of the legislature is shaped 
by the degree to which the political system is characterized by a separation of power. 
One of the core debates over the design of political institutions has been about the 
choice between presidential and parliamentary systems of government and its 
implications (Lijphart, 1992). A presidential system is broadly characterized by ‘a 
single individual, normally but not invariably called “president”…, popularly elected 
for a fixed term who plays the, or at least a, central role in the political system’ 
(Siaroff, 2003b). If legislative-executive relations are indeed more conflict-prone 
under presidentialism, as Linz has argued, one may expect the legislature to be more 
assertive in budgetary matters (Linz, 1990). For instance, Lienert suggests that in 
presidential systems ‘the legislature is a powerful agenda-setter and decision-maker’ 
and investigates whether this also applies to the realm of budgeting (Lienert 2005). To 
test this proposition, I construct a dummy variable for systems where a directly 
elected president is the head of government, excluding hybrid systems.9 I also include 
a federalism dummy to capture the vertical separation of powers (according to 
Griffiths, 2002). It is, however, not clear what effect to expect from the latter.10
 
Separation of purpose. A third proposition is that the legislative incentives for 
scrutiny grow as preferences over budget policy diverge, which can be a function of 
the party and electoral systems (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001). Under conditions of 
divided government, disagreements over policy between the legislative majority, or 
the median legislator, and the executive are likely to be stronger than under unified 
government. Divided government is defined as ‘the absence of simultaneous same-
party majorities in the executive and legislative branches of government.’11 
According to this definition, divided government in parliamentary regimes takes the 
form of minority government. The prediction is that in systems that experience 
protracted spells of divided government, legislatures shape institutional variables to 
strengthen their scrutiny capacity. I construct a divided government index, which is 
the ratio of years in which the government did not command a legislative majority in 
                                                 
9 Data from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2003). 
10 It should be noted that the budgetary bicameralism variable that is part of the budgetary powers 
index is not directly linked to federalism. It is true that federalism correlates strongly with 
bicameralism, but the reverse does not hold for unitary states. See Patterson and Mughan, Senates. 
Moreover, the index captures budgetary bicameralism, where the second chamber has co-equal powers 
in financial matters, which is not a direct implication of federalism. Note that a number of unitary 
countries in the sample have second chambers with co-equal budgetary powers, for example Bolivia, 
Chile and Italy, while a number of federal countries have second chambers with a limited role in 
budgetary matters, such as Belgium, India and South Africa. 
11 R. Elgie, ed., Divided Government in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001). Elgie distinguishes this arithmetical definition from a behavioral definition where divided 
government refers to ‘divisiveness’ or ‘the situation where there is conflict between the executive and 
legislative branches of government whatever the support for the executive in the legislature’ (p. 7). In 
this paper, I use the arithmetical definition. 
the lower house of the legislature.12 This index covers the ten-year period 
immediately before the OECD data were collected (1993-2002).13 I also include the 
effective number of parties as an alternative measure of party political 
fragmentation.14 However, the predicted effect of this variable is not obvious. On the 
one hand, a high degree of party political fragmentation in the legislature may impede 
collective action and hence strengthen the position of the executive vis-à-vis the 
legislature, whereas extreme concentration in many instances implies executive 
dominance, at least in parliamentary systems of government.15
 
The separation of purpose can also be attributed to the effects of different electoral 
systems. Carey and Shugart have explored how aspects of electoral formulas induce 
legislators to cultivate a ‘personal vote’ and distinguish themselves from their party 
affiliation (Carey and Shugart, 1995). This may diminish the ability of government 
parties to enforce party discipline even when they have a numerical majority in the 
legislature. Unfortunately, comprehensive data are not available for the entire sample. 
Instead, I test whether there is an effect of open list proportional representation.16 This 
electoral system is often regarded as candidate-centered.17
 
Development context. Institutions may be shaped by the broader development context 
of a country. In the case of this analysis, the expectation is that the capacity of 
legislative bodies to act as independent institutions for ‘horizontal accountability’ is 
likely to be less developed in authoritarian regimes or where democracy is weakly 
entrenched (O’Donnell, 1998). I include two economic and political context variables. 
The first is the combined average rating produced by Freedom House, which was 
designed to monitor progress and decline of political rights and civil liberties 
(Karatnicky, Piano and Puddington 2003). The second is Gross Domestic Product 
                                                 
12 Data up to 2000 from T. Beck, G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer and P. Walsh, ‘New Tools in 
Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions,’ World Bank Economic Review 
15:1 (2001), pp. 165-76. Data for 2001 and 2002 from Europa Publications, Europa World Yearbook 
(London: Europa Publications, various years). 
13 I also compiled an alternative specification of the divided government variable, which measures the 
ratio of years in which the government did not command a legislative majority in either the lower or 
upper house of the legislature, if the latter is co-equal in budgetary matters. In other words, where the 
consent of the upper house is required to pass financial measures, for instance in Chile and Italy, 
unified budgetary government requires that the executive has a majority in both houses. Where the 
consent of the upper house is not required, as for example in India and France, I consider only the 
situation in the lower house. Data on budgetary bicameralism from Wehner, Cross-national Variation 
in Legislative Budgeting. Both versions of the divided government index yielded substantively similar 
results and in the following I present only the findings for the first version of this variable. 
14 The measure was proposed by Laakso and Taagepera and has gained a high level of acceptance. M. 
Laakso and R. Taagepera, ‘“Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West 
Europe,’ Comparative Political Studies 12:1 (1979), pp. 3-27. An alternative measure proposed by 
Dunleavy and Boucek was also constructed and an analysis using the latter yielded substantively 
similar results as discussed in the next section. See P. Dunleavy and F. Boucek, ‘Constructing the 
Number of Parties,’ Party Politics 9:3 (2003), pp. 291-315. 
15 I added a power term to test for any curvilinear effects, which proved not significant and is not 
reported in the following section. 
16 I include the case of Ireland, which has used proportional representation by means of the Single 
Transferable Vote since independence in 1922. Data from P. Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting 
Rules and Political Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), as well as own research. 
17 A. Reynolds and B. Reilly, The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design 
(Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1997). The handbook is 
available online at http://www.idea.int/esd/publications.cfm [last accessed 21 January 2005]. 
(GDP) per capita.18 There is a strong correlation with a coefficient of -.8 between 
these two variables, so to some extent they represent alternative specifications.19
 
Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results of multiple OLS regression analysis. Before proceeding, a 
word of caution is in order. The dataset is relatively small and contains data on ‘only’ 
43 national legislatures. In statistical terms, this is not a large number, although it 
represents a sizeable proportion of the world’s parliaments.20 One of the dangers of 
small samples is that outliers skew the results. In this case, the dataset contains one 
upper outlier on the overall index as well as the legislative organization index, i.e. the 
US Congress. To assess the reliability of the findings, all models were also entered 
with a reduced sample excluding the US Congress; none of the variables that are 
significant with the full sample lost significance below the .1 level.21 The following 
paragraphs summarize the main findings. 
 
Table 2: Multiple OLS regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Powers Organization Information Total 
UK colony -16.046** (7.307) 
-9.835 
(6.236) 
13.808* 
(6.815) 
-4.024 
(4.352) 
Presidentialism 8.031 (6.726) 
-4.216 
(5.739) 
9.750 
(6.272) 
4.522 
(4.005) 
Federalism 5.008 (6.168) 
14.879*** 
(5.263) 
5.015 
(5.752) 
8.301** 
(3.673) 
Divided government 5.769 (8.600) 
24.357*** 
(7.339) 
8.272 
(8.021) 
12.799** 
(5.122) 
Effective parties .865 (1.323) 
.678 
(1.129) 
.531 
(1.234) 
.691 
(.788) 
Open list PR -9.300 (6.194) 
-5.633 
(5.286) 
.217 
(5.776) 
-4.905 
(3.689) 
Log GDP per capita 3.771 (7.175) 
-5.440 
(6.123) 
29.911*** 
(6.691) 
9.414** 
(4.273) 
Freedom House -2.154 (3.317) 
-3.970 
(2.830) 
-1.511 
(3.093) 
-2.545 
(1.975) 
Constant 40.246 (33.830) 
64.271** 
(28.869) 
-68.122** 
(31.550) 
12.131 
(20.147) 
R-squared .297 .430 .713 .641 
F-test 1.798 3.213*** 10.563*** 7.575*** 
Number of observations 43 43 43 43 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1 (two-tailed tests). 
 
Column one summarizes the model for the budgetary powers index. Only a single 
variable proved statistically significant in this model, viz. the dummy for former UK 
colonies, and the overall amount of explained variation is modest (R-squared = .297). 
This supports the proposition that colonial rule is associated with institutional 
                                                 
18 Logged; data from World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2003). 
19 The sign is negative because in the Freedom House ratings lower scores indicate more freedom. 
20 At the time of writing, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) reports a membership of 140 national 
parliaments: http://www.ipu.org/english/membshp.htm [last accessed 2 December 2004]. 
21 It is hoped that the findings will be replicated with data on more cases in the not too distant future. 
The OECD is currently in the process of planning a second round of its survey, which aims to increase 
the number of country responses. 
replication. The sign of the coefficient is negative, i.e. the Westminster heritage 
reduces the budgetary powers of the legislature. Notably parliamentary amendment 
powers with regard to ‘money bills’ are limited in the UK and this configuration has 
been exported to its former colonies. On the other hand, the overall low explanatory 
power of this variable, and the fact that all other variables proved statistically 
insignificant, appears to suggest that the particular configuration of legislative 
budgetary powers is largely driven by country-specific factors, which is in line with 
the findings of Lienert (2005). One caveat is that different patterns on the variables 
that make up the budgetary powers index are not picked up and deserve more 
disaggregated analysis elsewhere.22
 
The model for the legislative organization index is specified in column two. This 
model includes two significant explanatory variables with positive coefficients and 
accounts for over forty per cent of the variation on the dependent variable (R-squared 
= .430). Legislatures invest in more complex scrutiny structures, in particular 
parliamentary committees, if the political system is characterized by protracted spells 
of divided government. Apart from the US Congress, the parliaments of Sweden and 
Norway are examples where the association between a developed decision-making 
infrastructure and arguably institutionalized divided government is striking. Second, 
and somewhat surprisingly, legislatures in federal systems tend to have more complex 
legislative structures for financial scrutiny, possibly to provide a forum for 
intergovernmental bargaining and overseeing fiscal relations between different levels 
of government. Also, legislators with strong regional ties may have incentives to use 
the budget process to ensure benefits for their respective regions. 
 
The model for information access is specified in the third column. Two variables are 
statistically significant and have positive coefficients, i.e. the log of GDP per capita 
and the dummy for former UK colonies. The model accounts for more than two thirds 
of the variation on this index (R-squared = .713). The GDP per capita variable is 
highly correlated with the Freedom House ratings, suggesting that it is in part the 
quality of democracy that impacts on budget transparency. Moreover, some 
prerequisites for budget transparency, such as the use of modern information 
technology, depend more directly on access to prerequisite resources. A third reason 
might be that industrialized countries have for the past three decades cooperated with 
each other and developed common standards for budget transparency within the 
OECD framework, culminating in the publication of the Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency.23 Much of this work is setting the trend for the developing world. The 
GDP effect on budgetary information access can be interpreted to capture these 
underlying explanations. 
 
The statistical significance of the UK colony dummy in the third model might perplex 
at first glance. Several former UK colonies received high expert scores for their 
quality of budget documentation, in particular Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
South Africa. It is possible that there is a conception bias with regard to what aids 
                                                 
22 For example, the Icelandic Althingi and the Australian Parliament have identical scores on the 
budgetary powers index, but move in opposite directions on some of the component variables such as 
amendment powers and budgetary bicameralism. 
23 The OECD Network of Senior Budget Officials has been operational for 25 years. 
budget transparency and which countries achieve high standards.24 However, these 
countries also score highly on the two audit-related variables that are included in the 
index, i.e. the timeliness of financial audit and the capacity for performance or ‘value 
for money’ audits. One reason might be that there is active cross-fertilization in this 
area among anglophone OECD countries. 
 
The fourth column specifies the model for the total index of legislative budgeting. The 
effects of three variables are strong enough to be carried over into the overall index, 
viz. GDP per capita, divided government, and the federalism dummy, and the model 
accounts for almost two thirds of the variation on the total index (R-squared = .641). 
The UK colony dummy has opposing signs in models one and three. Because these 
coefficients cancel each other out, this variable has no overall effect that would be 
captured by the model for the legislative budgeting index. These results show that the 
model for the total index reflects the impacts of the independent variables on specific 
component indices. 
 
Discussion 
 
The regression results raise several questions for the comparative study of budget 
systems, legislative structures and political institutions in general. Attention has to be 
paid to not only the variables that proved statistically significant, but also to those that 
did not. In the following paragraphs, I frame the discussion of implications in terms of 
a series of contrasts, viz. presidential versus other systems of government, 
institutional features that are variable in the short-run versus those that are not, and ex 
ante versus ex post financial scrutiny. 
 
The non-impact of presidentialism:  
 
The presidentialism dummy is statistically insignificant for all indices. To elaborate 
on this finding, Figure 1 presents a box-and-whisker chart to compare the variation on 
the legislative budgeting index between the ten countries in the sample with 
presidential systems and those without (see appendix). The median score for 
presidential systems is slightly below the median score for other systems, as indicated 
by the thick bar in the middle of the shaded box. The shaded box contains the middle 
mass of data between the upper and lower quartiles. The ‘whiskers’ (the lines 
extending from the box) indicate the spread of the remaining cases that do not fall 
within the interquartile range. The whiskers include maximum and minimum values 
unless there are outliers, which are observations with a score of more than 1.5 times 
the midspread above the upper quartile or below the lower quartile. In this case, the 
US Congress is an upper outlier among pure presidential regimes. The chart serves as 
a reminder that one should not generalize the experience of the US Congress across 
presidential systems, and challenges the view that institutions in these two sets of 
                                                 
24 Refer to the discussion of this variable in the appendix of Wehner, Cross-national Variation in 
Legislative Budgeting. One reason might be that documents in English speaking countries are more 
easily accessible to international experts, unlike budget documentation in other less widely-spoken 
languages. However, some observers have been highly critical of aspects of the reforms in financial 
reporting in several anglophone countries. For example, Barton highlights negative effects on fiscal 
transparency of the application of accrual accounting in the Australian public sector. A.D. Barton, 
‘How to Profit from Defence: A Study in the Misapplication of Business Accounting to the Public 
Sector in Australia.’ Financial Accountability and Management 20:3 (2004), pp. 281-304. 
systems are inherently different. Rather, the results of this analysis support the 
argument that it is more fruitful to focus attention on the specific differences in the 
design of institutional aspects as well as their cumulative effect. Cheibub and Limongi 
make this point succinctly (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002): 
 
Parliamentary and presidential regimes are indeed founded on different 
constitutional principles, and this is a central choice in any democratic 
constitution. However, the operation of the political system cannot be entirely 
derived from the mode of government formation. Other provisions, 
constitutional and otherwise, also affect the way parliamentary and 
presidential democracies operate, and these provisions may counteract some of 
the tendencies that we would expect to observe if we derived the regime’s 
entire performance from its basic constitutional principles. 
 
Figure 1: How presidential systems compare against other systems 
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It is admittedly easy to misinterpret political dynamics as effects of presidentialism. 
For a long time, the study of divided government was largely confined to the US 
(Elgie, 2001). Here, shifting majorities among the branches of government and the 
different houses of Congress have given rise to instances of severe gridlock over 
policy and budgets (Williams and Jubb, 1996). However, divided government also 
occurs in parliamentary regimes, where it takes the form of minority government. 
While it is true that the constitutional roots of divided government differ between 
presidential and parliamentary systems, more recent research has argued strongly that 
divided government is a noteworthy feature not only of the US system but also 
various non-presidential systems (Laver and Shepsle, 1991). Several independent 
studies with different samples of parliamentary regimes have found minority 
administrations to account for about one third of governments (Strøm, 1990). In short, 
disentangling presidentialism from divided government suggests that the former has 
no immediately obvious implications for the role of the legislature, at least as far as 
financial scrutiny is concerned. 
 
Distinguishing fixed and variable institutional features 
 
Although this analysis is of a cross-sectional nature, the findings raise issues for the 
study of institutional change over time. The reason is that some of the institutional 
features discussed in section one can typically be adjusted more easily than others. 
Constitutional features, several of which are captured in the budgetary powers index, 
usually cannot be amended without supermajority support in the legislature. Because 
this requires a high degree of consensus that is unusual in most contexts, 
constitutional constraints in particular can be considered fixed in the short-run. Other 
features may be variable in the short-run. For instance, matters of legislative 
organization are largely an internal question that is for the legislature to decide and 
standing orders can be amended with relative ease. This makes variable institutional 
features potentially more responsive to shifting political dynamics such as diverging 
party majorities across the legislative and executive branches of government. 
 
Indeed, legislatures that have sought to strengthen their budgetary role have often 
done so by adjusting variable institutional features in their favor. The perhaps best-
known example is the overhaul of the US budget process with the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The reform created CBO to end the 
executive’s monopoly on budgetary information, instituted the Budget Committees in 
both chambers to facilitate fiscal decision-making, required budget resolutions to 
enhance control over aggregates and allocations, severely curtailed executive 
impoundment authority by regulating rescissions and deferrals, and shifted the 
beginning of the fiscal year from July to October to give Congress an extra three 
months to decide the budget (Wildavsky and Caiden, 2001). The acrimonious nature 
of legislative-executive relations during the Nixon administration, a period of divided 
government, gave impetus to the reforms, which also sought to counter a longer term 
shift towards executive dominance since the introduction of the executive budget 
process with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (Schick and LoStracco, 2000). 
 
There are other instances of legislative reorganization that illustrate the point. In 
Mexico, commentators for many years regarded Congress as ‘the epitome of 
weakness’(Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002) despite comparatively strong constitutional 
powers (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001). Since the reemergence of competitive party 
politics in the 1990s divided government has for the first time since 1917-1928 
become a feature of the Mexican system and Congress has started to make 
amendments to the presidential budget proposal (The Economist, 2004). In the wake 
of these political changes the Mexican Congress has also made institutional 
adjustments. For instance, the 2000 Federal Audit Law25 established a new 
congressional audit committee.26 Congress also put in place the Centre for the Study 
of Public Finance,27 modeled along the lines of CBO, to supply it with independent 
analyses of taxation and spending issues, and the 2000 budget was passed using a 
special rule that made it easier for deputies to move amendments (Weldon, 2002). 
 
                                                 
25 Refer to article 67 of the Ley de Fiscalización Superior de la Federación. 
26 Comisión de Vigilancia de la Auditoria Superior de la Federación. 
27 Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas. 
Not all such institutional adjustments are necessarily successful in that they 
unambiguously strengthen legislative control.28 Yet, a distinction between fixed and 
variable institutional features provides a useful framework for understanding the 
scope for institutional adjustments in response to changes in the political environment, 
such as the emergence of divided government, and sheds light on the extent to which 
political actors have the scope to act as institution-shapers. Whether specific 
institutional features are fixed or variable in the short-run does of course differ 
between countries, but features relating to legislative organization are frequently 
variable. 
 
The ex post scrutiny bias of the Westminster system 
 
The impact of the UK colony dummy is different from other explanatory variables in 
that it features in two models and with coefficients that have opposing signs. On the 
one hand, the Westminster heritage tends to reduce the budgetary powers of the 
legislature, and on the other hand it appears to strengthen legislative access to 
financial information. Moreover, some of the more subtle patterns in the data require 
further attention, which are not immediately obvious by looking at the aggregated 
indices. On closer examination, the Westminster model reveals a very particular ex 
post approach to financial scrutiny where parliament focuses on audit findings rather 
than budget policy. 
 
One indicator of this is the existence of committee expertise. Only five legislatures 
out of 43 in the sample do no involve a specialized budget committee during ex ante 
scrutiny of the government’s draft budget. Four of these are Commonwealth 
parliaments, viz. those of Australia, Canada, India and the UK; the fifth is the Dutch 
Parliament (Wehner, 2005). The absence of such a committee for ex ante scrutiny 
means that a government-wide view of budget policy and fiscal aggregates cannot 
easily be formed. The involvement of sectoral committees is useful, but it can never 
substitute, only complement, the broader perspective of a specialized budget 
committee. On the other hand, all former UK colonies in the sample have a 
specialized Public Accounts Committee (PAC).29 The modern PAC dates back to 
1861 when the House of Commons, based on the initiative of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, William Gladstone, resolved to establish a committee to scrutinize 
government accounts.30 These reforms established an audit model predicated on close 
interaction between parliament and the supreme auditor that has been widely adopted 
throughout the Commonwealth (McGee, 2002). National legislatures outside the 
Commonwealth that use audit committees include those of Argentina, Austria, 
Denmark, Hungary, Israel, Japan and Mexico. 
                                                 
28 For comments on the US case, see Wildavsky and Caiden, The New Politics of the Budgetary 
Process, 81-2. It is still too early to assess the longer term impact of the Mexican reforms. 
29 One exception is New Zealand, where the functions of the former PAC were given to the Public 
Expenditure Committee in 1962 and to the Finance and Expenditure Committee in 1985. The functions 
of the new committee are wider than those of a traditional PAC, and include the ‘audit of the Crown’s 
and departmental financial statements, Government finance, revenue and taxation.’ Written 
correspondence to the author from the Clerk of the New Zealand House of Representatives, 
Wellington, 14 October 2002. 
30 The first such committee was appointed in 1690 under the Act for Appointing and Enabling 
Commissions to Examine, Take and State the Publick Accounts of the Kingdom. However, the use of 
the committee for political purposes undermined its reputation and the practice of parliamentary audit 
lapsed under Walpole’s administration. See Einzig, The Control of the Purse, 168. 
 
What is unique to the Westminster system is the combination of low ex ante capacity 
with highly developed ex post capacity. In other words, the Westminster model back-
loads financial scrutiny, whereas legislatures outside the Commonwealth tend to 
apply committee expertise either in a more balanced way or in favor of ex ante 
scrutiny. One reason may be that, in the Westminster tradition, successful attempts by 
parliament to amend the budget proposal of the executive are considered tantamount 
to a vote of no confidence in the government.31 As a result, party discipline is 
particularly high during debates on ‘money bills’ and the only possible space for 
critical in-depth engagement with public finance is the PAC, which upholds a cross-
partisan convention of not questioning the merits of underlying policy (Wehner 2003). 
That the distinct structures and conventions of the UK Parliament continue to shape 
financial scrutiny in many former colonies is evidence of the long shadow of history. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Several variables account for cross-national differences in legislative arrangements 
for financial scrutiny. The analysis finds that legislative access to budgetary 
information is better in advanced industrialized democracies and, possibly, in 
anglophone countries. Legislative organization tends to be more extensive in federal 
systems and under conditions of divided government. Finally, the budgetary powers 
of legislatures are affected by institutional replication due to colonial rule. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the statistical analysis finds no evidence of an inherent difference 
between presidential and non-presidential systems. 
 
These results raise several implications for comparative research. One is the 
possibility to explicitly distinguish fixed and variable institutional features in order to 
better understand patterns of institutional change. Most importantly, however, the 
findings highlight the danger of using a small number of cases to generalize across 
countries. More specifically, the US Congress and the UK Parliament are not typical 
legislatures, although they are arguably the most extensively studied representative 
bodies. In this analysis, the US Congress emerges clearly as exceptional among 
presidential systems, whereas the Westminster system is distinct with regard to its 
pattern of financial scrutiny and should not be taken as representative of 
parliamentary regimes in general. The implication is that comparative research should 
focus on differences in particular institutional features and their cumulative effect 
rather than to assume that the mode of government selection is inherently decisive. 
 
                                                 
31 The emergence of this convention is linked to an incident in 1919 when the Commons denied the 
Lord Chancellor funding for a second bathroom. In response, Lord Birkenhead refused to move into his 
official residence. The Treasury subsequently initiated a change in procedure that removed the drafting 
of money resolutions from the Commons to the Treasury. Successive governments drafted more 
restrictive money resolutions that increasingly curtailed the scope for amendments and debate. See 
Einzig, The Control of the Purse, 290-4. As consecutive governments became ‘hypersensitive’ to 
parliamentary challenges every step in the financial procedure became linked to the question of 
confidence. Reid, The Politics of Financial Control, 77. 
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United States 97 90 100 100 0 1 1 0.6 2.0 0 4.50 1.0 
Sweden 77 80 67 85 0 0 0 1.0 4.2 1 4.51 1.0 
Norway 74 80 67 75 0 0 0 1.0 5.4 0 4.59 1.0 
Hungary 70 80 67 63 0 0 0 0.0 2.2 0 3.76 1.5 
Netherlands 66 80 33 85 0 0 0 0.0 4.7 1 4.49 1.0 
Argentina 63 53 57 80 0 1 1 0.8 3.0 0 3.82 3.0 
Denmark 62 60 53 73 0 0 0 0.9 4.8 1 4.59 1.0 
Austria 62 70 47 70 0 0 1 0.0 2.9 1 4.52 1.0 
Germany 61 60 63 60 0 0 1 0.0 3.4 0 4.52 1.0 
Japan 61 80 47 57 0 0 0 0.5 3.6 0 4.64 1.5 
Australia 60 60 40 80 1 0 1 0.0 2.5 0 4.39 1.0 
Mexico 59 63 50 65 0 1 1 0.5 2.8 0 3.57 2.0 
Italy 57 70 27 75 0 0 0 0.4 2.1 0 4.33 1.0 
Canada 55 40 40 85 1 0 1 0.0 2.7 0 4.37 1.0 
Finland 53 60 27 73 0 0 0 0.0 4.9 1 4.51 1.0 
Iceland 53 60 27 73 0 0 0 0.0 3.7 0 4.50 1.0 
New Zealand 53 40 40 80 1 0 0 0.2 3.8 0 4.28 1.0 
Portugal 53 50 57 53 0 0 0 0.6 2.6 0 4.12 1.0 
Czech Republic 52 50 67 40 0 0 0 0.6 3.7 0 3.76 1.5 
Israel 52 50 47 60 0 0 0 0.5 8.7 0 4.23 2.0 
Belgium 51 40 50 63 0 0 1 0.0 9.1 1 4.50 1.0 
France 51 27 67 60 0 0 0 0.1 2.3 0 4.49 1.0 
Slovenia 51 43 37 73 0 0 0 0.0 4.9 1 4.09 1.0 
South Africa 50 30 40 80 1 0 1 0.0 2.2 0 3.62 1.5 
Spain 49 53 57 37 0 0 1 0.3 2.5 0 4.25 1.0 
United Kingdom 48 50 20 73 0 0 0 0.0 2.2 0 4.36 1.0 
South Korea 47 37 27 78 0 1 0 0.6 2.4 0 4.15 2.0 
Colombia 47 67 33 40 0 1 0 0.1 3.1 0 3.36 4.0 
Uruguay 47 73 27 40 0 1 0 0.0 3.1 0 3.74 1.0 
Indonesia 46 53 53 32 0 0 0 0.2 5.3 0 3.03 3.5 
Morocco 43 57 47 27 0 0 0 0.0 10.7 0 3.17 5.0 
Slovakia 43 33 37 60 0 0 0 0.2 6.1 1 3.66 1.5 
Chile 43 37 27 65 0 1 0 0.0 2.0 1 3.74 1.5 
India 42 40 40 47 1 0 1 0.3 5.9 0 2.69 2.5 
Ireland 41 20 40 63 1 0 0 0.7 3.3 1 4.48 1.0 
Turkey 38 53 27 33 0 0 0 0.4 1.8 0 3.47 3.5 
Nigeria 36 60 40 7 1 1 1 0.0 2.3 0 2.39 4.5 
Kenya 34 37 40 27 1 1 0 0.0 2.2 0 2.51 4.0 
Greece 31 30 30 33 0 0 0 0.0 2.2 1 4.15 1.5 
Suriname 31 40 47 7 0 0 0 0.0 2.2 1 3.02 1.5 
Bolivia 29 60 27 0 0 1 0 0.0 5.0 0 2.98 2.5 
Cambodia 25 40 30 5 0 0 0 0.0 2.4 0 2.51 5.5 
Jordan 22 27 20 18 0 0 0 0.1 1.7 0 3.22 5.5 
Note: The shaded rows indicate the upper quartile, median and lower quartile on the total index. 
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Legislative Budgeting in the Czech Republic1
 
Zdenka Mansfeldová 
Petra Rakušanová 
 
 
The design of budget process  
 
The procedure of approving the state budget differs from the general legislative 
process. The negotiation of the State Budget is governed by rules defined in the Rules 
of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies2. The budget negotiation process3 proceeds 
in the following manner:  
The cabinet submits a draft act on the state budget to the Speaker of the Chamber of 
Deputies no later than three months prior to the start of a new budget year (by 30 
September of the previous year); amendments to the draft act may be submitted until 
15 days prior to the session of the Chamber of Deputies at which the first reading is to 
take place. The Speaker assigns the draft act on the state budget to the Budget 
Committee for discussion. After the draft act is assigned to the Budget Committee, the 
first reading takes places at a session of the Chamber of Deputies. There, deputies 
engage in a general parliamentary debate on the basic aspects of the budget, such as 
the revenues and expenditures, the balance, settlement of the balance, the general 
relationship to the budgets of the higher territorial administrative units and 
municipalities, and the scope of powers assigned to executive bodies. If the draft act is 
not approved, the Chamber recommends that the cabinet redraft the bill, and sets a 
date for the new draft to be submitted. If the Chamber of Deputies approves the basic 
aspects of the budget it is not possible to change them later during the negotiation. 
The procedure of approving the state budget differs from the general legislative 
process. A draft of the state budget is debated independently and cannot be contingent 
upon a proposal for the adoption or amendment of another act [Kolář, Pecháček, 
Syllová 2002:188]. 
 
If the Chamber of Deputies approves the basic information in the draft act on the state 
budget, individual chapters are then assigned to committees. Committees are assigned 
a deadline (the minimum period is 30 days) and are obligated to discuss the individual 
chapters of the draft act on the state budget they have been given by that deadline. 
Committees may propose changes only to those chapters of the state budget they have 
been assigned to discuss.  
 
The Budget Committee debates the committees’ resolutions and opposing views on 
individual chapters of the draft bill in the presence of rapporteurs, and adopts a 
resolution. During the second reading, the draft act on the state budget is introduced 
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, January 6-8, 2005, New 
Orleans, USA, K-10/B-9 Roundtable: The Role of Parliaments in the Budget Process. 
The study is based on results of the  GA AV CR Project No. S7028003 „Information and 
Documentation Centre on the Parliaments of Central Europe“ and Project No. 1J 004/04-DP1 „Political 
and legal institutional framework of the Czech Republic and its changes in the  context of the accession 
to the EU.“ 
2The Parliament of the Czech Republic has two chambers and consists of the Chamber of Deputies 
with 200 Deputies and the Senate with 81 Senators. 
3 Rule of Procedures, Part thirteen. 
by the Submitting Party. The Budget Committee’s rapporteur speaks after the 
Submitting Party. During the detailed parliamentary debate, amendments and other 
proposals are submitted. From a political perspective, the comment phase is the most 
important because it is in this phase that individual deputies (who, for example, did 
not have a chance to directly participate in the preparation of the draft act) try to 
secure funds for their constituencies. 
 
The third reading of the draft act on the state budget may start no earlier than 48 hours 
after the second reading has been completed. During the parliamentary debate, 
corrections of legislative mistakes or mistakes of technical nature, corrections of 
grammatical mistakes, and proposals for repeating the second reading are the only 
items that may be proposed. At the conclusion of the third reading the Chamber of 
Deputies votes on the submitted amendments, and at the end the Chamber decides 
whether it will express agreement with the draft act. 
 
Until the adoption of the new Rules of Procedure in mid-1995, the draft act (the whole 
budget) was discussed by the Budget Committee and also by a number of other 
committees, after which a joint report was submitted. This procedure offered more 
opportunity for lobbying, and it was easier for a lay opinion to defeat a professional 
opinion as each committee had only one vote and the special Budget and Economy 
Committees formed a minority (of the usual 4-5 committees involved). An 
amendment to the Rules of Procedure resulted in the Budget Committee obtaining 
more competencies. Currently, it is very difficult for a deputy to secure any funds for 
his/her own constituency, because a deputy is expected to specify how the proposed 
expenditure will be paid for, i.e., what other expenditures should be cut in order to 
obtain money for the specific purpose. 
 
The most important stage of the bargaining process is the first reading, which is meant 
to give a clear outline of the total amount of the mandatory expenditures (i.e., 
expenditures explicitly required by law), the total expenditures and revenues, the 
balance of the State Budget, and the budgets of municipalities. The Budget 
Committee must seek to preserve a balance between revenues and expenditures. After 
subtracting the mandatory expenditures, a mere 15 per cent of the total funds allocated 
for expenditures remain; it is necessary to come to an agreement on which sphere (e.g. 
education, science or healthcare) will be emphasised. This percentage is further 
reduced when we consider ongoing investment projects of the government that cannot 
be abandoned or unwritten EU and NATO obligations (percentages that are given for 
certain chapters of the budget, such as 1.2 per cent for science, 2 per cent for defence, 
etc.). This means that all the publicity given in the media actually concerns a small 
number of items debated in the Parliament. This may be the place to mention that the 
first round of putting together particular expenditures takes place at the ministries. 
This is why the ministries seem to be in a much better position to advance particular 
interests, as this environment is much less transparent compared to the Parliament, 
and the Chamber of Deputies is only the second step in lobbying. 
 
The growing percentage of mandatory and quasi-mandatory expenditures and 
expenditure programmes that have already been launched limit the flexibility of the 
public budget expenditures in the short-term horizon.4 The disproportionate increase 
                                                 
4 Act on the 2004 Budget, www.psp.cz/cgi.bin/win/docs/tisky/tmp/T0460y0.doc 
in mandatory expenditures, which significantly exceed the speed of growth of the tax 
income revenues, is today the elementary problem of the fiscal policy of the cabinet, 
and the subject of harsh criticism from the opposition. 
 
As already mentioned, the Act on the State Budget is approved by the Chamber of 
Deputies. The negotiation is ideologically divided from the very beginning of the 
process, and therefore the debate and voting on the state budget is always a key issue 
for parliamentary party groups. Considerable party discipline is required in the vote, 
and voting at variance with the decision adopted by a Parliamentary Party Club may 
have very unpleasant consequences for individual deputies, especially if the cabinet 
has a very narrow margin in the Chamber. This has been a major problem since 1996 
(see Appendix 1). The reason for the relatively low party unity (Rice’s Index of Party 
Cohesion around 80 units) lies in the size of the voting coalitions that approve 
individual bills: the large majorities mean the parliamentary party groups do not have 
to act with absolute unity. This results in lowering the transaction costs political 
parties would otherwise have to expend to ensure that their bills are approved by 
narrow-margin majorities. As an example, we can take the vote on the State Budget at 
the beginning of 1997, when the cabinet had a narrow majority [Mansfeldová 1997, 
2002]. Two ČSSD deputies who did not vote according to the approved party line 
were expelled from the party. One of them joined the rightwing ODS soon afterwards. 
 
The approval of the budget is generally one of the key tasks of the Parliament, and, as 
can be gleaned from Table 1, it is one of the most important activities according to the 
deputies. In addition to the explicitly formulated control of the cabinet, the highest 
importance was still attached to the adoption of the state budget, which is one of the 
means by which the cabinet can be indirectly controlled [Reytt 2000, Soltéz 1995] 
 
Tab. 1: The importance of individual activities of the Parliament between 1993 
and 2003 
Activities 1993 1996 1998 2000 2003 
Legislative activities 4.78 4.50 4.67 4.97 4.72
Control of the government 4.61 4.22 3.94 4.64 4.27
Consideration and evaluation of proposals 
submitted by various social groups 
3.22 2.83 3.00 3.74 3.17
Approval of the state budget 4.78 4.72 4.72 4.95 4.80
Processing of petitions and comments of citizens  3.39 1.56 3.22 3.86 3.37
Preparation of the EU accession - * - * 4.22 4.61 4.06
1 = least important, 5 = most important 
Source: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic (SOÚ AV ČR). 
 
If we compare the scores of each activity in time as well as in individual functional 
terms, it can be said that the approval of the state budget is rated by the deputies 
among the highest. While the score for other activities tend to change over time, the 
trend for the approval of the state budget remains stable. This is also in accordance 
with the perception of the committees described further in the text.  
 
An analysis of voting in the Chamber of Deputies also shows that voting on the State 
Budget is one of the key political issues that are usually decided strictly along party 
lines. At our disposal we had data on the voting on nine state budgets, starting with 
1995; a more detailed analysis of voting is possible in five years. Older records were 
not available. 
 
Tab. 2: Voting on the state budgets in the 1st electoral term (%) 
 ČMSS 
(ČMUS) 
ČSSD KDS KDU-
ČSL 
KSČM LB LSNS LSU ODA ODS SPR-
RSČ 
1995 0 11 100 100 0 0 100 0 94 100 0 
1996 31 0 100 100 0 0 100 - 100 98 0 
Source: Archive of Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic 
Note: During the term the ruling coalition consisted of the following parties: ODS, KDS, KDU-ČSL, 
and ODA. 
 
Tab. 3: Voting on the state budgets in the 2nd electoral term (%) 
 ČSSD KDU-ČSL KSČM ODA ODS SPR-RSČ 
1997 3 100 0 100 99 0 
1998 0 100 0 100 100 0 
Source: Archive of Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic 
Note: During the term the ruling coalition consisted of the following parties: ODS, KDU-ČSL and 
ODA. When the cabinet resigned at the end of 1997, the 1998 budget had already been approved. 
 
Tab. 4: Voting on the state budgets in the 3rd electoral term (%) 
 ČSSD KDU-ČSL KSČM ODS US 
1999 97 90 100 0 0 
2000 100 0 0 88 0 
2001 93 5 0 90 0 
2002 96 0 0 98 0 
Source: Archive of Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic 
Note: During the term the Czech Republic had a minority social-democratic cabinet (ČSSD), which 
was able to stay in power thanks to the “Opposition Agreement” concluded with the strongest 
opposition party – ODS. 
 
Tab. 5: Voting on the state budgets in the 4th electoral term (%) 
 ČSSD KDU-ČSL KSČM ODS US 
2003 100 100 0 0 90 
2004 100 0 0 100 100 
Source: Archive of Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic 
Note: Today, a coalition cabinet with a narrow majority in the Parliament is in power in the Czech 
Republic, consisting of ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and US. 
 
The data contained in Tables 2 to 5 illustrate what percentage of each PPG voted in 
favour of a submitted budget, and which abstained or did not participate (often 
allowing the budget to be adopted). The data proves the great party discipline in 
voting on the State Budget. Sometimes, the budget is not adopted on the first attempt, 
as was the case with the 2000 budget. The Parliament did not pass the government 
budget. Only the deputies of the minority government of the social democratic party 
voted for the budget. Right-wing deputies voted against it and the Communists 
abstained from voting. As a result, the government operated on a provisional budget. 
The budget had to be renegotiated again at the beginning of 2000, at which time the 
opposition parties reached an agreement and the budget was approved (this can be 
seen in Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
The Budget Committee 
 
Legislative and supervisory activities in each parliament carried out in parliamentary 
committees. In these committees, major decisions are made on a majority of drafts of 
acts. With the exception of legislation, the most important task of the committees is to 
review the functioning of the cabinet. This task is the natural consequence of a system 
of government in which the administration is directly and continuously responsible to 
the Parliament. Committees are the main practical working instrument through which 
these responsibilities are carried out.  
 
The Budget Committee is crucial for the negotiation of the budget (called the Budget 
and Control Committee until the transformation of the Czech National Council into 
the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as at 1 January 
1993), and it is also one of the most prestigious and busiest committees of the 
Chamber of Deputies, as is shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Committees according to their prestige in the Chamber of Deputies of 
the Czech Republic (%) 
 
Committee 1st term 2nd term 3rd term 4th term 
 1993 1996 1998 2000 2003
Constitutional Committee  91,9 88,7 63,9 60,9 40,2
Budget Committee 61,0 89,4 84,1 89,4 91,1
Economic Committee 60,3 41,5 42,7 49,7 49,7
Foreign Affairs Committee 26,5 21,3 27,4 20,7 25,4
Committee for Defense and Security 11,8 16,3 28,0 25,1 17,2
Committee for Social Policy and Health 
Care 
8,1 12,0 22,3 15,1 10,1
Committee for Science, Education, 
Culture, Youth, and Sports 
5,1 7,0 4,5 2,8 5,9
Petition Committee 3,7 2,8 0,6 1,7 3,6
Agricultural Committee  2,9 7,7 9,6 5,0 11,8
Committee for Public Administration, 
Regional Development, and 
Environment 
2,2 1,4 7,6 18,4 16,6
Committee for European Integration * * * 5,0 4,1
Mandate and Immunity Committee 1,5 4,2 2,5 3,4 2,4
Election Committee * * * * 1,2
* in these years the committee did not exist 
Source: Parliamentary DICe, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic (SOÚ 
AV ČR) 
 
In rating of the committees by prestige, we can see similar trend as in rating of the 
individual activities of the parliament. With the exception of the first term, the Budget 
committee is perceived with the highest prestige. This is mirrored in the peopling of 
the committee as well; the deputies with high professional skills tend to be nominated 
to the committee. The members of the Budget committee also tend to have high 
probability of re-election. In the case of re-election, they usually again join the Budget 
Committee.    
 
It is worth noting that this Committee is a purely “men’s issue”. During the monitored 
period there was not a single woman on the Committee. The responsibilities of the 
Budget Committee extend much beyond just debating the state budget and individual 
budget chapters. The Committee receives regular reports on the management of the 
Czech Republic (quarterly, and a summary report for the whole year), the withdrawal 
of funds from the state budget, reports on the monetary policy (SBČS/ČNB) and 
management of the Czech National Bank (SBČS/ČNB), reports on the results of 
activities and the utilisation of budget funds in individual years, and reports on the 
management from the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic.  
 
The Budget Committee can establish sub-committees to perform its supervisory 
responsibilities, and these sub-committees can focus professionally on specific issues 
in a more concentrated way. It is up to the Budget Committee to decide on the number 
and types of sub-committees it will establish. During almost all terms there was an 
audit sub-committee. 
 
The Budget Committee debates any and all changes during the course of the year that 
occur with respect to events funded by the state budget, transfers of funds in chapters 
of individual ministries etc. As the deficit of the state budget5 is currently growing, 
deputies strive to play a more active role as early as the phase of the budget 
preparation. An example of this was the deputy bill of a constitutional act on budget 
discipline; however, this bill was defeated in the first reading. 
 
Supreme Audit Office 
 
According to the Constitution, Article 97, an independent institution – the Supreme 
Audit Office (SAO) – audits national property management and implementation of 
the State Budget. The President and Vice-president of the SAO are appointed by the 
President of the Republic at the recommendation of the Chamber of Deputies. The 
Chamber of Deputies, and specifically the Budget Committee, initiates the tasks of the 
SAO; the co-operation has been very good so far, and there is mutual understanding 
and agreement. The SAO has a duty to submit a summary report of its activities, a 
report of its economic activities, and its budget to the Chamber of Deputies. The latter 
approves it at the suggestion of the Budget Committee and following consultations 
with the SAO. The Ministry of Finance is obligated to adopt the budgets of the 
Chamber of Deputies, Senate and SAO as suggested by the Parliament. 
 
The Audit Sub-committee of the Budget Committee has selectively dealt with some 
findings of the SAO; it also has at its disposal detailed records of audits, has the right 
to call the respective Minister, etc. There are many SAO findings, and therefore the 
Audit Sub-committee can opt to choose only those cases that it deems to be 
particularly significant. Because it has access to the necessary documents, such as 
                                                 
5 On 3 December 2003 the Chamber of Deputies passed a draft of the 2004 state budget with 98 votes 
of the coalition deputies. The budget is expected to have a deficit of CZK 115 billion, revenues of CZK 
754 billion and expenditures of CZK 869 billion. The state budget deficit continues to grow. 
Development of the state budget deficit (billions CZK) 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Deficit -5.4 -17.4 -25.6 -34.8 -51.8 -66.7 -45.9 -111,3 -115,1 
Source: MF, quoted according to Právo, 4 December 2003, p. 1, article “The Cabinet can have a 
breather, the budget passed”. 
records of audit etc., the Audit Sub-committee is able to study a particular case in 
depth. Then, on the basis of its own proceedings, the Audit Sub-committee informs 
the Budget Committee, which in turn considers how to deal with the findings. 
 
The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament approves the budget and report of 
activities of the National Property Fund. The activity of the Fund is then checked by 
the SAO and its reports are submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. The Export Bank, 
as well, submits reports of activities, reports of its economic activities, and its budget 
to the Chamber of Deputies. (The bank was established by the State and gets state 
subsidies but generates revenues to cover its costs.) The cabinet is obligated to submit 
a closing state account to the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
If we examine the options available to the Parliament, especially the agenda discussed 
by the Economic Committee, the Budget Committee and the Audit Sub-Committee, 
we see that control consists primarily in the acquisition of information. Parliament can 
act mostly ex post facto by establishing inquiry committees to examine a suspicious 
case. After the 1996 elections, when a balance between the right-of-centre and left-of-
centre forces was achieved, it was possible for the opposition parties to gain more 
efficient control, although it was a disjointed opposition.6 This can be seen as 
progress in developing democratic mechanisms, and we can even see a great effort by 
the Parliament to monitor the cabinet, for example, by setting up parliamentary 
Inquiry Committees. 
 
Trends, indicators, explanatory factors 
 
If we examine the activities of the Budget Committee since 1990 (see Table 7), we 
reach the conclusion that legislative activity related to the State Budget, especially in 
the legislative phase, is on the rise. 
 
Tab. 7: Activity of Budget Committee in five terms 1990 – 2004 
Term 1990 – 
1992 
1992 - 
1996 
1996 - 
1998 
1998 – 
2002 
2002 till 
election 
From 
17.7.2002
2003 2004 
Number of 
members 
17 - 18 17 - 20 20 21 21 21 21 21 
Number of 
committee 
meetings 
65 78 36 59 24 8 14 16 
Number of 
adopted 
resolutions 
398 627 318 560 324 116 196 176 
Source: Archive of Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic 
 
The Budget Committee, as well as other committees, adopts a growing number of 
resolutions related to the State Budget that concern not only the drawing of the budget 
but also its control. As for the opportunity of individual deputies to influence the 
preparation of the State Budget, the situation has not changed much: deputies of the 
ruling parties have a greater chance to formally and informally influence the budget. 
Conversely, opposition deputies take greater advantage of parliamentary hearings. 
                                                 
6 In addition to Social Democrats, it consisted of Communists and Republicans, parties defined in 
Sartori’s terminology as parties without a coalition potential, which weakened the influence of the 
opposition. 
Furthermore, lobbyists tend to influence the process through the deputies of the ruling 
parties because it is more efficient. 
 
The cabinet is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies for meeting the state budget 
obligations. After the elapse of six months, the cabinet submits a semi-annual report 
to the Chamber of Deputies in which it assesses the development of the economy and 
the fulfilment of the Act on the State Budget. The Budget Committee again plays a 
key role. The Chamber of Deputies approves the Closing State Account; the Budget 
Committee debates individual chapters of the Closing State Account.  
 
Control functions of the Budget Committee 
 
As stated above, the Budget Committee may establish various sub-committees to 
perform its supervisory functions. In the third term these were the Sub-committee for 
Capital and Financial Markets and the Audit Sub-committee; in the fourth term (2002 
– present) the Sub-committee for the Financial Management of Territorial Self-
Administration and for the Utilisation of European Funds was established in addition 
to the Audit Sub-committee. 
 
During the process of decentralisation, which is part of the European integration 
(based on which a wide range of decision-making powers were transferred in 2001 
from the central to the district level), the Parliament has strengthened its supervisory 
function. If we understand the Audit Sub-committee as the control mechanism of the 
Parliament against the cabinet, then the Sub-committee for the Financial Management 
of Territorial Self-Administration and for the Utilisation of Funds of the European 
Union is an attempt to partially control the financial flows between supranational (EU 
funds) and sub-national levels (districts) [Rakušanová 2003].  
 
Table 8. Fulfilment of the state budget between 1991-2003 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Earnings 
total / 
 bill. CZK                           
 
Budget 241 
249,
9 342,2 385,3 446,2 497,6 519,6 547,2 581,3 592,2 636,2 693,4 686,1 
754,1 
Reality 
225,
3 
251,
4 258 390,5 440 482,8 509 537,4 567,3 586,2 626,2 
705,0
4 699,7 
559,3    
till 
30.9.04 
Spending 
total /  
bill. CZK                           
 
Budget 
239,
9 
255,
9 342,2 385,3 437 497,6 519,6 547,2 612,4 627,3 685,2 
755,6
5 817,8 
869,1 
Reality 
240,
1 
253,
1 356,9 380,1 432,7 484,4 524,7 566,7 596,9 632,3 693,9 
750,7
6 808,7 
599,9 
till 
30.9.04 
Surplus/de
ficit/  
bill. CZK                           
 
Budget 1,1 -6 
          
x 
           
x 9,3 
          
x 
          
x 
          
x -31 -35,2 -49 
-
62,25 -131,7 
- 115,1 
Reality 
-
14,8 -1,7 1,1 10,5 7,2 -1,6 -15,7 -29,3 -29,6 -46,1 -67,7 
-
45,72 -109,1 
-113,1 
till 
30.9.04 
Duration of 
parlia-
mentary 
proceeding 
   1 
day 
2 
days 
2 
days 
3 
month 
1 
month 
3 
month 
3 
month 
3 
month 
4 
month 
6 
month 
3 
month 
3 
month 
3 
month 
 
2 month 
(29.9.-
3.12) 
Sources: Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, Parliamentary DICe, Institute of Sociology, 
Academy of Science of the Czech Republic (SOÚ AV ČR) 
 
In the process of consolidating democracy in the Czech Republic, the Parliament has 
become functionally embedded in the constitutional system, deputies have become 
more professional and the professional back-up support has improved, and the 
functions of the Parliament have crystallised. If we look at Table 8 (Fulfilment of the 
state budget 1990-2003), we see more-or-less balanced budgets between 1992 and 
1996, but starting in 1997 there has been an increase in the state budget deficit. In 
2000 and 2001 the budget deficits were higher than planned, approximately 31 per 
cent and 36 per cent, respectively. This deficit is due primarily to the lower actual 
revenues compared to the planned ones. 
 
Here we should note that over the last few years the cabinet has started an artificial 
reduction of the state budget deficit using “extra-budgetary” revenues, especially 
privatisation funds (by selling large state enterprises). In the Parliament, the 
opposition in particular has strongly criticised these non-systemic measures. The 
cabinet has promised to cover some of the budget expenditures from the National 
Fund (EU funds) to a much greater extent after the EU accession in 1 May 2004; the 
Czech Republic has thus far only been allowed to take advantage of the pre-accession 
funds (ISPA, Phare, Sapard, Twinning projects etc.). 
 
Today, we are seeing a great structural reform of public finances. More than a mere 
modification, these reforms should result in a restructuring of the State Budget as 
such, especially changes in welfare, pension, tax and healthcare spending. The main 
objective of the reform is to transform the state budget from being a fiscal policy tool 
into a public management tool, i.e., a performance-driven model based on defining 
goal and benchmarks, on negotiation, and on a system of contracts and agreements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
An analysis of Parliamentary activities in terms of budget shows that during the 
process of transformation and democracy consolidation in the Czech Republic, the 
functions of the Parliament with respect to the state budget have undergone a great 
transformation. In this process, the professionalisation of deputies in general, and 
particularly in the Budget Committee, is a crucial factor. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the Budget Committee, like Parliament as a whole, was composed of people 
without any previous experience of top politics. Only rarely did a deputy have an 
economic background. In the first meeting of the Committee it was proposed that 
appointments to the Committee take into account professional background. This 
proposal was rejected, and it was agreed to distribute posts in the Committee to all 
political parties equally. Gradually, deputies have become more professional and have 
learned how to work with information, how to obtain it, and how to evaluate it 
critically. Today, the Budget Committee is considered the most prestigious and most 
influential parliamentary body.  
 
The problem with the role of the Parliament in the budgeting process lies primarily in 
the need for large coalitions in voting, and in the large transaction costs associated 
with party cohesion, i.e., in party-political landscape rather than in the institutional 
capacity. Generally, we have seen an increase in party discipline in voting on the 
budget. On the other hand, we are also witnessing growing number of changes 
proposed by individual deputies.  
 
The Parliament is aware that its legitimacy may be eroded in the context of European 
integration, and therefore to counter that threat is strengthening its auditing functions. 
This also pertains to the Budget Committee, which has focused on the sub-national 
and supranational levels, the management of territorial self-administrations, and the 
utilisation of European Union funds. We can expect that after the accession of the 
Czech Republic to the EU this type of activity will be given priority.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1. 
 
The composition of the government and its support in the Parliament 
Cabinet created Governing party/parties % of Parliamentary 
seats 
June 1990 – Federal 
government 
9 OF, 4 VPN, 2 KDH, 1 independent 65% 
June 1990 – Czech 
government 
10 OF, 2 KDU-ČSL, 1 HSD-SMS, 8 
independent 
84% 
June 1992  
Czech government 
11 ODS, 4 KDU-ČSL, 2 ODA, 2 KDS 56 % 
July 1992 “temporary”  
Federal government 
4 ODS, 4 HZDS, 1 KDU-ČSL, 1 
without party affiliation 
52,7% 
June 1996 8 ODS, 4 KDU-ČSL,  
4 ODA 
49,5% 
January 1998 (semi-
caretaker gov.) 
3 KDU-ČSL, 4 US-former ODS, 3 
ODA,  
7 without party affiliation 
31% 
August 1998 18 ČSSD, 1 without party affiliation 37% 
July 2002 11 ČSSD, 3 KDU-ČSL, 3 DEU 50,5% 
 
 
Appendix 2. 
Names of Political Parties in English and Czech and their Czech Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation  Name of the party in English Name of the party in Czech 
ČMSS/ 
ČMUS 
Czech-Moravian Centre Party /Bohemian 
and Moravian Union of the Centre 
Českomoravská strana středu/ 
Českomoravská unie středu 
ČSSD Czech Social Democratic Party Česká strana sociálně demokratická 
DEU Democratic Union Demokratická unie 
KDU – ČSL Christian Democratic Union/ 
Czechoslovak People´s Party 
Křesťansko demokratická unie/ 
Československá strana lidová 
KDS Christian Democratic Party Křesťansko demokratická strana 
KSČM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy 
LB Left Block Levý blok 
LSNS National Socialist Liberal Party Liberální strana národně sociální 
LSU Liberal-Social Union Liberal-Social Union 
ODA Civic Democratic Alliance Občanská demokratická aliance 
ODS Civic Democratic Party Občanská demokratická strana 
SPR – RSČ Association for the Republic – Republican 
Party of Czechoslovakia 
Sdružení pro republiku – 
Republikánská strana Československa 
US Freedom Union Unie svobody 
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Does the Parliament Make a Difference? 
 
The Role of the Italian Parliament in Financial Policy 
 
Carolyn Forestiere 
Riccardo Pelizzo 
 
 
A recent survey conducted in a sample of 83 countries by the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union in collaboration with the World Bank Institute on the “Relations between the 
Legislature and the Executive in the Context of Parliamentary Oversight” allows 
cross-national comparison for the role of legislatures in the budgetary process. One of 
the survey’s most significant indications is that legislatures in presidential systems are 
generally more involved in the preparation of the budget than legislatures in either 
parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. The picture, however, is very different 
when we look at legislatures’ oversight of the budget. Parliaments are generally more 
involved in the examination and final approval of the budget than are legislatures in 
presidential and semi-presidential systems1. In the light of these considerations, it 
should not be terribly surprising to find that the executive is more likely to be 
accountable to the legislature for its spending in parliamentary systems than in 
presidential systems.  
 
All this seems to imply that legislatures in parliamentary have considerable power to 
influence and shape the budget. In reality, however, this power is remarkably inferior 
to what the list of formal powers suggests. Each parliament’s ability to examine, 
amend, modify, confirm, and approve the budget is constrained by both institutional 
and political factors. On the institutional side, in many countries Parliament’s ability 
to alter the government’s budget is subject to extensive procedural limits.2 For 
example, in the UK, Parliament can amend tax proposals, but cannot increase 
spending.3 In Germany, parliamentarians’ ability to modify the budget is constrained 
by budget regulations as well as by the expenses generated by current legislation.4 On 
                                                 
1 On these and related issues, see Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst, “Legislatures and Oversight: 
A Note”, Quaderni di Scienza Politica, “Legislatures and Oversight: A Note”, Quaderni di Scienza 
Politica, vol. XI, n. 1 (aprile) 2004, pp. 175-188; an abridged version of the paper can also be found in 
Riccardo Pelizzo, David M.Olson, Rick Stapenhurst (eds.),  Trend in legislative  Oversight, World 
Bank Institute Working Paper- Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development 
(forthcoming); see also Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst, “Tools for Legislative Oversight: An 
Empirical Investigation”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3388, September 2004. 
2 For comparative data concerning the passage of the budget in parliament see Valentine Herman (in 
collaboration with Françoise Mendel), Parliaments of the World. A reference compendium, New York, 
De Gruyter, 1976, pp. 762-791; International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation of the Inter-
parliamentary Union, 2nd edition, Aldershot, Hants (UK), Gower, 1986, pp. 1091-1122. Updated 
information can be found in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Role of 
Legislature. 19th Meeting of Senior Budget Officials, Paris 25-26 May 1998. PUMA/SBO (98)4, 
unclassified, pp. 1-80. 
3 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Role of Legislature. 19th Meeting of 
Senior Budget Officials, Paris 25-26 May 1998., op. cit., p. 76. 
4 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Role of Legislature. 19th Meeting of 
Senior Budget Officials, Paris 25-26 May 1998, op. cit., p. 37. See also Joachim Wehner, “Reconciling 
Accountability and Fiscal Prudence? A Case Study of the Budgetary Role and Impact of the German 
Parliament”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 7, n. 2, (Summer) 2001, pp. 57-78. 
the other hand, there are countries, such as Belgium and Canada, where there are no 
institutional limits on Parliament’s ability to amend the budget. While such conditions 
might imply extensive legislative participation, there are, however, fairly obvious 
political limits to such potential interference. Significant modification of the 
executive’s budget would imply a loss of confidence of the parliamentary majority 
and would, in all likelihood, initiate or exacerbate a government crisis.  
This means that the preparation, choice and implementation of the budget are 
influenced by both institutional and political conditions. But which are more 
important? What predictions of legislative activity can be made? We attempt to 
answer these questions first by outlining the institutional and party system theories 
that explain Parliaments’ ability to shape budget and by testing these theories on 
changes to the national budget in the Italian Parliament. The Italian Parliament is an 
excellent preliminary case study for the theory that institutional and political 
conditions influence Parliament’s ability to modify the national budget for two 
reasons. On the institutional side, the Italian has a complex array of procedural 
opportunities within the legislature, which may encourage extensive parliamentary 
activity during the amendment and the passage of the budget. On the political side, 
Italy has experienced undisciplined parties (and coalitions) and government instability 
(Pelizzo and Cooper 2002), both of which have led to general legislative 
ineffectiveness (Pelizzo and Babones 2001). Furthermore, and most importantly, there 
have been extensive changes to both the institutional design and the political climate 
of the Italian Parliament over the past 20 years. As a result, with a quasi-experimental 
design, we can gauge if there was any change in legislative activity after the 
institutional and/or political changes occurred. This can be done using original data 
that measures the difference between the government’s proposed budget and the 
parliament’s final law each year. Positive findings would compel us to conclude 
preliminarily that institutions and political conditions matter significantly for 
parliament’s real ability to modify a national budget.  
 
Institutional Theories 
 
In virtually all parliamentary systems, the executive in parliamentary systems fully 
controls budgetary politics. Parliament’s role is purposively restricted. Because the 
executive is paramount for setting the national budget, the comparative literature on 
budgeting reflects the importance of executive institutions (Roubini and Sachs 1989; 
Borrelli and Royed 1995; Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999). This literature emphasizes 
the collective action problems within the executive for reaching decisions.  
 
Literature to investigate the role of the legislature in budgetary politics has also 
emerged. These studies argue that a Parliament’s ability to shape the budget is deeply 
affected by institutional factors. Institutions in this context refer to the “rules of the 
game,” that is, the procedural and structural mechanisms that actors use to influence 
policy outcomes (North 1990). 
 
For example, Krafchik and Wehner argue that the impact a legislature can have on the 
budget depends on the formal design of amendment powers, on the scope of conferred 
powers and on the role of committees (Krafchik and Wehner 1998).5 Poterba and 
Hagen also consider the effect of a broad array of legislative institutions on fiscal 
                                                 
5 There are three main types of conferred powers: unrestricted, restricted, and balanced budget. 
policy (Poterba and Hagen 1999). The more institutions allow a greater number of 
actors to influence budgetary politics, the more difficult it is to bring budget deficits 
under control.  For example, budgetary institutions include procedures such as the 
timing of voting or amendments procedures (Alesina and Perotti 1999). These 
procedures create iterative collective action problems in which individual legislators 
from the government and opposition continually find incentives to defect from 
austerity agreements and secure particular benefits for narrow constituencies. This 
occurs at the expense of collective fiscal austerity. 
 
When procedurally permitted, legislatures may serve to alter an executive’s original 
budget proposal. Each country’s institutional opportunities thus affect the incentive 
structures that individual legislators can manipulate.6 The availability of these types 
of procedures empowers the legislature. Though minor, this influence should be 
understood. Parliaments are not universally impotent, especially in the presence of 
particular types of party systems that are conducive to shifting majorities. 
 
Party system theories 
 
A Parliament’s ability to shape, alter and modify the national budget is also affected 
by political factors. Most theories concerning the party system generally argue that 
legislatures naturally defer to executive proposals simply because parliaments are 
governments are ‘fused.’ Because the government must maintain majority support in 
the legislature in order to survive, it follows that legislatures should support 
government proposals, especially important ones.7 According to Laver and Shepsle: 
 
In terms of practical politics, however, a cabinet in which the government 
parties control a majority of seats in parliament can summon up a legislative 
majority whenever it cares to do so, provided party discipline holds firm. Thus 
a majority government with disciplined parties can comprehensively dominate 
any legislature once it has been installed in office. This in turn means that the 
legislature cannot in practice pass laws constraining the government.8 (Laver 
and Shepsle 1996: 57).  
 
Despite the power of this parsimonious argument, there are still significant exceptions 
to this rule. Laver and Shepsle themselves define the conditions under which 
parliaments would engage in activities to challenge their governments: “when party 
discipline breaks down and dissident members of a government party join forces with 
the opposition to pass legislation on some particular issue,” it is possible for the 
parliament to impose “its will on a majority executive” (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 40). 
 
A corollary of such political theories thus suggests that it is particularly difficult for 
governments to always control their legislative majorities and keep them together 
when the parliamentary party system is highly fragmented and when there are 
profound ideological divisions in the legislature. Therefore we expect that 
                                                 
6 This point should not be overstated, however. In virtually all legislatures, changes to the executive’s 
budget are often minor. But the point remains that in some countries, the government’s budget may not 
always be passed as presented. 
7 According to Laver and Shepsle “the role of the legislature is much more that of controlling the fate 
of government than it is of implementing policy directly” (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 57).  
 
parliamentary influence is not only affected by the institutional opportunities in 
parliament, but by the party system as well.  
 
The Italian Parliament 
 
The Italian Parliament provides a perfect setting to test the institutional and party 
system theories because there have been major revisions to the institutional design 
and to the party system over the past 20 years. These changes may have had an effect 
on parliamentarians’ abilities to influence financial legislation. The institutional 
revisions include the removal of the secret vote (1988), a revision of the parliament’s 
decentralized agenda setting process (1990), and the reduction of preference votes in 
the electoral system (1991). In addition, the electoral system has changed (1993), 
which may have led to a different configuration of political parties in the party 
system.  
 
Institutional Factors 
 
The Secret Vote  
 
Until 1988, the standing orders of the Parliament allowed secret voting. No official 
record was kept on how each MP voted; only the number and names of those present 
and voting were recorded and counted. Though the government should have had 
enough support to pass its bills, the government was often defeated (and 
embarrassingly so) on many bills, including important proposals, during the first 40 
years of the Republic.  
 
However, because no official record was recorded, party whips could not know who 
was responsible for the government’s defeat – the so-called franchi tiratori – and thus 
no sanctions could be imposed on defectors. This problem often stalemated the 
executive and caused numerous governments to collapse. Ironically, these stalemates 
occurred even during times of oversized government, when the government should 
have been able to garner enough support from its parliamentary majority to pass its 
bills.  
 
Because this problem threatened Italian political stability, reform legislation passed in 
1988 abolished the provision of secret voting, except for very special circumstances, 
such as votes of no confidence. The open vote (il voto palese) is now required for the 
great majority of all bills. The use of the secret vote is important for the empowerment 
of the parliament before 1988 because party members were able to defect without 
sanction from party leaders. Government party leaders especially could use 
parliament during financial debates for their own benefit, rather than unilaterally 
supporting the government on financial legislation.  
 
Parliamentary agenda setting 
 
In 1971, the Italian Parliament passed reforms to implement a unique agenda setting 
formula that extended veto power to a leader from each parliamentary group during 
the determination of the legislative agenda and calendar (Leonardi et al 1978; della 
Sala 1988, 1998; Cotta 1994). Setting the parliamentary agenda is an important tool to 
manipulate public policy (Doering 2001; Tsebelis, 2002). For example, in 1986 the 
government suffered a significant setback when the order of voting for the Financial 
Bill was discussed. The Minister of the Treasury (DC) wanted to vote on the total 
spending amount in Article 1 first in order to set an upper cap for spending, but the 
opposition argued that it preferred to vote on other articles first and on Article 1 last. 
The opposition clearly did not want to limit the amount of money Parliament could 
commit to spending, and knew that it could, through subsequent amendments, raise 
the overall amount as long as the ceiling was not already set. The crucial point is that 
the agenda setting process in the Italian Parliament prohibited the government from 
imposing a timetable unattractive to the opposition. As a result the government was 
defeated and the Finance Law was passed over two months late. Della Sala argues: 
 
The important point about this discussion on what seems to be a technical 
point is that it highlights the fact that the government has few guarantees over 
the fate of its program once it reaches Parliament…The government was 
defeated over an issue it saw as crucial for achieving its objectives primarily 
because it had few levers which it could pull once the bill reached Parliament. 
(della Sala, 1988:121) 
 
Because of persistent problems with the agenda, additional reforms were passed in 
1990 to strengthen the President of the Chamber, who currently has the ability to 
impose an agenda when a unanimous vote does not pass.  
 
Preference Votes 
 
Another significant institutional factor empowering Parliament was Italy’s electoral 
system. Until 1993, when it was reformed by the laws 276/93 and 277/93, the Italian 
electoral system used proportional representation. This system was coupled with 
preference voting, which allowed voters to express their preference for a specific 
candidate. Voters could express up to three or four such preferences until 1991, when, 
in the wake of a national referendum, the number of preferences that voters could 
express on the ballot was reduced to only one. The PR system with single preference 
(preferenza unica) was used only in the 1992 elections, until the system was further 
revised from PR to a mixed electoral system in 1993. But before 1991, preference 
voting affected the political behavior of voters as well as of the elected officials. 
Though in most PR systems, voters express a single choice for a party, candidates in 
Italy were concerned not only inter-party competition but also with intra-party 
competition because a higher number of preference votes could make a difference for 
a legislative seat. As a result, MPs often competed against members of their own party 
to secure the highest number of preference votes. This gave individual MPs strong 
incentives to secure constituency benefits and to gain popularity and name 
recognition. The more benefits an MP managed to secure for her potential voters the 
more preference votes the MP could expect to receive in the next election. Because of 
the preference vote, opposition members knew that engaging in collaborative 
activities with members of other parties could result in increased constituency benefits 
for all MPs. 
 
Party System Factors 
 
In addition to producing strong incentives for individual MPs to secure constituency 
benefits, the pre-1993 PR electoral system also produced a highly fragmented and 
ideologically polarized party system. In 1990, the number of effective parties in the 
Italian Parliament was 7.45, the second highest among the Western European 
democracies. For this time period, only Belgium had a slightly higher number of 
parties.9 In addition, the extent of ideological polarization among Italian parties was 
also the second highest in Western Europe as well.10 Only France had more extensive 
polarization. France and Italy are similar with regard to polarization; traditionally in 
the postwar period, there was significant support for extreme left-wing and extreme 
right-wing parties in both countries. Extensive fragmentation and polarization 
produced undisciplined parliaments. Because of fragmentation, bargaining costs 
within parliament were quite high. Individual defection from party mandates and 
shifting coalitions among individuals and parties were not uncommon. In addition, the 
presence of extreme ideological polarization led to two phenomena. First, MPs 
learned to logroll particularistic policies that often spent government funds 
unchecked. Notoriously referred to as the leggine, these are minute forms of 
legislation passed in parliament (di Palma 1977). One clear indication of this trend is 
the number of individual spending proposals introduced in parliament each year. At 
least before 1979, the number of items voted by Parliament each year was “about 300 
for revenues and approximately 3,000 for expenditures” (Onofri 1979:298). Because 
encompassing collective decisions were difficult to reach, Italian MPs learned to use 
decision rules in the parliament for policy benefits in their own constituencies. 
Second, fragmentation meant that parliamentary majorities are often formed among 
ideologically dissimilar parties. Bills had to reflect a variety of interests before 
receiving majority support. Otherwise they faced intense scrutiny in parliament. 
 
How have these processes changed in the wake of the institutional reform and 
changes to the political landscape? First, with the removal of the secret vote in 1988, 
the passage of reforms in 1990 to allow the President of the Chamber to impose a 
parliamentary agenda, and the introduction of the single preference 1991, the system 
of incentives was dramatically transformed. In addition, it is possible that the 
restructing of the electoral system in 1993 altered the party system as well. If it is true 
that the institutional mechanisms that permit extensive policy influence have been 
removed, and if the party system is no longer as fragmented or polarized as before, 
then the benefits of defecting from government-party unity should decline. Therefore, 
if the logic between parliamentary strength and the intersection of procedural 
mechanisms and legislative fragmentation and polarization is correct, there should be 
a steady decline of parliamentary influence starting in 1988. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
OLS regressions are used to test whether the institutional and/or party system changes 
have influenced parliament’s ability to amend the government’s budget. The 
dependent variable is the percentage difference between the government’s proposed 
bill and the parliament’s approved law for the spending side of both the Budget. 
Superficially, these data implicate quite clearly that the Italian parliament has not 
always been a ‘rubber stamp’ on financial policy. Instead, at times the Italian 
                                                 
9 The higher number of effective parties in Belgium must be qualified by the fact that many Belgium 
parties operate in pairs to reflect differences in region and language. 
10 Polarization is measured as the percentage of support for the extreme left and extreme right wing 
parties. In Italy these are the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the neo-fascist Italian Social 
Movement (MSI). 
Parliament has been an important actor in the determination of spending priorities. 
See Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Italian Budget Laws for 1982 to 2001. Figure indicated is the total amount 
of spending for each year. All amounts are in billions of lire.11
 
For Year 
PROPOSED  
by Government 
PASSED  
by Parliament 
Percent 
Difference 
1982 135460 164087 17% 
1983 172772 203510 15% 
1984 227077 242321 6% 
1985 274163 297597 8% 
1986 280900 334543 16% 
1987 311432 358997 13% 
1988 368360 414814 11% 
1989 388562 406271 4% 
1990 456202 445655 -2% 
1991 498505 509594 2% 
1992 541967 559556 3% 
1993 612696 588981 -4% 
1994 563208 549658 -2% 
1995 611073 611390 0% 
1996 647486 637007 -2% 
1997 633348 642245 1% 
1998 634393 653414 3% 
1999 658278 672500 2% 
2000 673282 679779 1% 
2001 700646 725944 3% 
 
 
We use several independent variables, based on the theories elaborated above, to 
explain differing levels of parliamentary interference in spending priorities in Italy. 
First, our measure of legislative institutions tracks the changes to the institutional 
design of the Italian Parliament over the past 20 years.12  Second, to measure party 
system attributes, both legislative polarization and legislative fragmentation are 
included. Legislative polarization is measured as the sum of the seats held by the most 
left-wing and the most right-wing parties. For most years, the two most extreme 
parties were the Italian Communist Party and the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, 
often comprising at least 30% of the total seat share. The larger the seat share of 
extremist parties, the more polarized the parliament. The percentage of seat share for 
extreme parties changed, however, after international events dampened the appeal of 
the Communist Party, domestic scandals shook the major parties, and the electoral 
                                                 
11 There is a fairly high correlation between the amount of influence in the Financial and Budget Laws: 
r=.62. This suggests that the same underlying processes are at work for both laws. In addition, since the 
Finance Bill is passed first, the Budget Bill is modified to reflect each Finance Law’s new ceiling for 
spending (when applicable). This is partially the reason the correlation between the two is high.  
12 The institutions variable is measured as follows: Value of 3 for 1982-1988 to measure the presence 
of secret voting, the inclusive agenda setting process, and the use of three or four preference votes 
(depending on the district) in the electoral system. Value of 2 for 1988-1990 to measure the presence of 
the inclusive agenda setting process and the use of three or four preference votes in the electoral 
system. Value of 1 for 1991-1992 to measure the use of only one preference vote in the electoral 
system. Value of 0 after 1993; the electoral system changed from pure proportional representation with 
preference votes to a mixed system with no preference votes.  
system changed from PR to a mixed majoritarian formula. These changes may have 
also influenced the number of effective parties (Taagerpera and Shugart 1989).  
 
The results of our regression analyses are presented in Table 2. When we regress the 
percentage change between the budgets proposed by the government and the budget 
approved by the parliament against polarization we find, as expected, that the 
parliament’s ability to modify the budget increases as polarization increases. 
Polarization by itself explains more than 45% in the variance of the parliament’s 
ability to alter the budget. This is because more disperse points of view need 
accommodation in order to reach consensus in parliament. But when we regress the 
percentage change between the proposed budget and the approved budget against 
fragmentation we find, in contrast to what party system theory claims, that the 
parliament’s ability to change the government budget declines as fragmentation 
increases. This anomaly could very well be explained by the fact that when a 
parliament is too fragmented it becomes increasingly difficult to form any alternate 
majority and that can change the status quo. Next, when we regress the percentage 
change between the government budget and the budget approved by the parliament 
we find that institutional change largely explains the Italian parliament’s ability to 
modify the budget. In fact, institutional change accounts for 64% of the variance in 
the parliament’s power to alter the government budget. And finally, when all the 
independent variables are entered in our model we find that while institutional change 
remains a fairly strong and significant determinant of the parliament’s ability to 
change the government budget, the influence of both polarization and fragmentation 
becomes insignificant. This suggests that the institutional variable trumps the power 
of the party system. Based on this finding, we preliminarily conclude that 
parliamentary institutions, at least in the Italian context, are more important than the 
party system in explaining the extensive amount of parliamentary influence in the 
determination of spending priorities. 
  
Table 2. Regression Analyses 
Dependent 
variable 
Intercept Independent Variables (sig.) R-squared 
Percent 
change 
between 
proposed 
budget and 
passed budget 
 Polarization Fragmentation Institutional 
Change 
 
 -8.593 
(.027) 
.494 
(.001) 
  .464 
 24.259 
(.000) 
 -3.777 
(.001) 
 .497 
 -.187 
(.884) 
  3.886 
(.000) 
.640 
 -7.400 
(.623) 
.027 
(.902) 
1.075 
(.615) 
4.629 
(.033) 
.645 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Clearly, more testing is required, both within the Italian context and comparatively, to 
determine the power of institutions and the party system in explaining how and when 
parliaments would be expected to influence national budgets. Based on the results of 
this analysis, using novel data to gauge the difference between the first and last drafts 
of budget legislation, institutions explain more of the variation in parliamentary 
influence. This tentative finding could be, however, spurious. Institutional reform 
took place before the party system changed and thus the effect we note may not be 
absolute. It is entirely possible that had the reforms proceeded in the reverse 
(changing the electoral system before changing the procedural mechanisms), the party 
system variables would have explained more than the institutional ones. More testing 
in other contexts would confirm the power of the independent variables. At the very 
least, this analysis has served to demonstrate that these variables do explain part of 
parliamentary influence in the budget. Comparatively, we would not expect 
parliaments to be ‘rubber stamps’ at all. The specific rules in parliament and the 
number and ideological bent of parties combine to provide incentives for parliaments 
to deviate from what is considered standard parliamentary behavior, in which 
parliaments unilaterally support their governments during the passage of the national 
budget.  
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The Value of a Nonpartisan, Independent, Objective Analytic 
Unit to the Legislative Role in Budget Preparation 
 
Barry Anderson 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Legislatures in different countries play a wide variety of different roles in the budget 
formulation process (Santiso, 2005).  Some are very actively involved, and some are 
not involved at all.  Moreover, the role that the legislature plays in many countries has 
changed over time and should continue to change in the future (Schick, 2002).  These 
changing roles call into question the sources of information that are or may be made 
available to assist the legislature participate in the budget process.   Legislatures 
require reliable, unbiased information to be able to participate in a constructive 
manner in formulating the budget.  This paper discusses the value of a non-partisan, 
independent, objective analytic unit to the legislative role in the budget preparation 
process. 
 
The paper does not address whether there should be a role for the legislature in budget 
preparation.  Some have argued that legislative activism may weaken fiscal discipline 
(von Hagen, 1992) or increase the level of pork barrel spending, although certainly 
legislatures are not the only source of overspending (Wehner, forthcoming). As 
fundamental as these issues are, this paper only addresses the potential value of a non-
partisan objective unit, not the larger issue of what should be the balance of power 
between the executive and legislative in budget preparation 
 
The paper begins by discussing the potential value of a non-partisan, independent, 
objective analytic unit to the legislature.  The next section lists and discusses each of 
the core functions that such a unit can perform.  Other possible functions of the unit 
are also discussed.  Next, the characteristics required to make the unit non-partisan, 
objective, and independent are described.  Other characteristics that can enhance the 
effectiveness of the unit are also listed.  The next section lists countries with 
specialized legislative research organizations, and discusses in some detail—including 
specific staffing functions—three legislative research organizations within the United 
States.  The last section contains some concluding remarks. 
 
Potential Value  
 
In its most basic terms, an independent analytic budget unit can provide information 
to put the legislature on a more equal footing with the executive.  This information is 
critical if a legislature is to play a real role in budget formulation. But as important as 
this information is, such a unit can do much more than just eliminate the executive’s 
monopoly on budget information.   
 
• Simplifies complexity.  Budget information is frequently not made available 
by the executive’s budget office, but even when it is, it may be so complex 
that the legislature has difficulty understanding it.  An independent unit must 
have the expertise to be able to make complex budget information 
understandable to the legislature, as well as to the media, academia, and the 
public. 
• Promotes transparency.  Because of the knowledge and expertise found in an 
independent budget unit, budgetary legerdemain can be discouraged and 
transparency promoted. 
• Enhances credibility.  By encouraging simplification and transparency, an 
independent unit also has the effect of making all budget forecasts—even 
those of the partisan executive—more credible. 
• Promotes accountability.  The accountability of the estimates used in the 
budget process can be enhanced by an independent budget unit because of the 
scrutiny such a unit provides to the executive’s budget office.  
• Improves the budget process.  The combination of a more simple, 
transparent, credible, and accountable budget can promote a budget process 
that is more straight forward and easier to understand and follow. 
• Serves both the majority and minority.  A legislative budget unit—if it is 
truly nonpartisan and independent—should provide information to both the 
majority and all minority parties of the legislature. 
• Provides rapid responses.  As a unit that is part of the legislature, an 
independent budget unit can provide much more rapid responses to budget 
inquiries from the legislature than an executive budget unit. 
The additional values of an independent legislative budget unit mean that it is much 
more than just an instrument to assist the legislature in the budget process, or one to 
help check the executive’s budget power, but also serves the society at large and 
actually can help improve the whole budget process.  Note also that the value of an 
independent unit can change over time.  At first, the information produced by the unit 
may be more valuable to the legislature as whole as a means to balance the 
executive’s budget power.  But as the unit ages and as the executive adjusts to the 
presence of the independent unit, the information it produces may be of more value 
for minority parties in the legislature vis-à-vis the majority party.  
 
Core Functions 
 
There are many possible functions that an independent analytic budget unit can 
perform, but to best assist the legislature in the budget preparation process, it should 
perform at the very least the following four core functions. 
 
• Economic Forecasts.  The first core function of the unit is to perform an 
independent economic forecast.  All budgetary analyses must begin with an 
economic forecast. Although the unit’s forecasts need to be objective, they 
should take into account the forecasts of others and be based on current laws.  
They should not try to take into account the economic consequences, if any, of 
policy proposals.  The assumptions used for interest rates and commodity 
prices should not be targets, but objective forecasts based on the best 
information available.  To prevent outlandish forecasts, the forecasts of private 
forecasters, central bankers (if available), and panels of experts specifically 
organized to assist the unit’s forecasters should be considered.  It is also better 
for the unit’s forecast to be a little conservative because it is much easier 
politically to use the results of a better-than-forecasted economy to reduce 
deficits and debt than it is to try to find last minute spending cuts or tax 
increases to meet a revised deficit target that results from a worse-than-
anticipated forecast. 
• Baseline Estimates.  The forecasts of spending and revenues should be 
projections, not predictions.  That is, they should be based on laws that are 
currently in place, not on policy proposals.  They should not try to judge the 
legislative intent of laws, but, for example, they should assume that the 
expiration dates built into legislation will actually occur, and that the spend 
out rates of slow-spending capital projects are based on the best technical 
information available, not on biased political opinions.  
• Analysis of the Executive’s Budget Proposals. The third core function of an 
independent unit is to perform a budgetary assessment of the executive’s 
proposed budget.  Such an assessment should not be a programmatic 
evaluation, which is basically a time consuming political exercise, but rather a 
technical review of the budgetary estimates contained in the executive’s 
budget.  Such a review can actually enhance the credibility of the executive’s 
budget, if the difference between the two estimates is not great and of the 
government’s forecasts as a whole, if the difference between the assessment 
and the actual outcome is not great. 
• Medium Term Analysis.  All of the core functions mentioned above should 
be performed over at least the medium term.  This alerts the executive and the 
public to the out year consequences of current and proposed policy actions.  It 
is particularly important to do a medium term analysis to take into account 
various fiscal risks, such as those inherent in loan guarantee programs, 
commitments to provide pensions, public-private partnership initiatives, and 
other programs that contain contingent liabilities.  A medium term analysis 
also provides the basis for a long term analysis, the importance of which 
grows as societies age and the impact of programs that involve 
intergenerational transfers expands. 
Other functions that the independent unit could perform include: 
• Analysis of proposals.  Hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of policy 
proposals can be made each year by members of the legislature, and the 
executive often makes many policy proposals in addition to those contained in 
the budget.  An independent unit can provide valuable assistance to the 
legislature by estimating the costs of these proposals. But because it can be 
very time consuming to estimate the budgetary impact of every proposal, it 
may be appropriate for the legislature and the unit to agree on a rule—such as 
estimating the costs of only the proposals with the largest budgetary impact or 
only those proposals approved by a full committee or significant 
subcommittee—that limits the number of proposals costed by the unit. 
• Options for spending cuts.  Legislatures can often benefit from having 
available a list of options for spending cuts prepared by an independent unit.  
The options should be based on program effectiveness and efficiency, not on 
political concerns.  The unit should only list the options; it should not make 
recommendations for any option because do to so could raise questions about 
its independence.  As valuable as such a list of options can be to empower the 
legislature, this function can also be time consuming, although its staffing 
impact can be mitigated if the listing of options is produced only at the 
beginning of a new legislative session.   
• Analysis of mandates.  Legislation can impact the economy through ways in 
addition to spending and taxing decisions; it can require actions on the part of 
corporations, individuals, or sub national governments through use of 
regulations, or mandates, written into legislation.  An independent unit can 
provide valuable information to the legislature by estimating the economic 
impact of mandates, but again this can be a time consuming task depending on 
how many mandates are reviewed and how complex they are. 
• Economic analyses.  The expertise found in an independent budget unit can 
also be used to perform more extensive economic analyses.  These analyses 
can contribute to the legislature’s understanding of the near term and long 
term budgetary consequences of related policy proposals and also assist the 
unit’s staff in preparing the “core” estimates of budget proposals.  The staff 
consequences of these economic analyses can be restrained if they are 
performed very selectively. 
• Tax analyses.  In addition to the types of budgetary and economic analyses 
mentioned above, a unit can also serve the legislature by performing various 
types of analyses of tax policies, such as estimating the impacts of proposed or 
enacted tax changes on economic growth, or measuring the distributional 
impacts of various different types of tax proposals.  Again these analyses can 
be time consuming, and they can require specialized staff whose skills are not 
easily transferred to analyses of spending proposals. 
• Long term analysis.  As mentioned above, the value of long term analyses—
that is, analysis of potential budgetary trends for as many as 75 years—
becomes more valuable to legislatures because of the aging of the populations 
in many countries, and because so many countries have programs that transfer 
resources (and costs) from one generation to another. 
• Policy briefs.  The time demands placed on policy makers in both the 
executive and the legislature and the complexity of budgets have created a 
demand for short, straight forward descriptions of complicated budget 
proposals and concepts.  Such descriptions, or policy briefs, can be of real 
value not only to busy members of the legislature, but also to the media and 
the public. 
As valuable as each of these other functions can be to the legislature, the size of the 
staff required to perform them usually limits the number that can be performed.  
Examples of the staff required to perform various functions in three independent 
legislative budget agencies in the US are presented in Tables 1 and 2 below.   
 
Table 1: Distribution of CBO Staff 
Function Core Other Total 
Executive Direction 5 5 10 
Macroeconomic Analysis 5 15 20 
Tax Analysis 5 15 20 
Budget Analysis 80 
   Baseline 20  
   Analysis of Proposals 45  
   Mandates 15  
Program Divisions 75 75 
Technical & Administrative 10 20 30 
     Total 45 190 235 
 
Table 2: Staffing by core function 
Core Function CBO IBO (NYC) 
LAO 
(Calif) 
Executive Direction 5 6 3 
Macroeconomic & Tax Analysis 10 4 5 
Budget Analysis 20 12 36 
Technical & Administrative 10 5 9 
     Total 45 27 53 
 
Fundamental Characteristics 
 
Establishing and maintaining a non-partisan analytic unit that provides independent, 
objective budgetary information to the legislature is not easy.  There are certain 
fundamental characteristics of the unit that must be present if the unit is to be 
successful.  Foremost of these is the non-partisan nature of the unit.  Note that non-
partisan is much different than bipartisan: the former connotes lack of a political 
affiliation; the latter connotes affiliation with both (or all) political parties.  A unit that 
is bipartisan would attempt to present its analysis from the perspective of both (or all) 
political parties, where a unit that is non-partisan would not present its analysis from a 
political perspective at all.  Clearly a non-partisan unit would be superior in 
presenting objective information.  The director of such a non-partisan unit may be a 
member of a political party himself, but this does not make the unit itself partisan as 
long as: he is more of a technician than a politician; he operates the agency in a non-
partisan manner; and the staff is composed entirely of technicians. Operation in a non-
partisan manner would require, among other things, that the same information is 
provided to the majority and minority parties.  Other fundamental characteristics of a 
non-partisan analytic unit include making the outputs of the unit and the methods by 
which those outputs are prepared transparent (especially reports that are critical of 
proposed policies) and understandable.  
 
Additional characteristics that are important for the successful operation of the unit 
include: 
 
• Placing the core functions of the unit in law so that they can’t be easily 
changed to suit political purposes; 
• Avoiding recommendations; 
• Briefing relevant members of the legislature immediately before a report is 
issued, especially if the report contains information that is negative to a 
proposal; 
• Principally serving committees or subcommittees rather than individual 
members; 
• Being willing to meet with lobbyists or other proponents—as well as 
opponents—of  policy proposals, keeping in mind that a fair, balanced 
process—and the appearance of a fair, balanced process—is always 
important; 
• Locating the unit’s offices separate from the legislature, but always answering 
requests in a responsive and timely manner; and, 
• Avoiding the limelight. 
Examples of Independent Budget Units 
 
In 2003, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
the World Bank conducted a joint survey of 40 OECD and non-OECD countries on 
budget practices and procedures.1  Question 2.10.e of the survey asked: “Is there a 
specialized budget research organization attached to the legislature that conducts 
analyses of the budget?  (Note this organization may be part of the audit office.)”  
Thirty-nine countries responded: three (Korea, Mexico, and the US) had organizations 
with 26 or more professional staff; one (Japan) had an organization with ten to 25 
staff; seven (Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Jordan, Netherlands, and Sweden) 
had organizations with less than ten staff; and 28 did not have such organizations. 
 
The oldest and biggest of these organizations is the US Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO).  The CBO was created primarily as a tool to check the growing power of the 
president.2  In the views of many in the US Congress in the early 1970’s, President 
Nixon had abused the powers of impoundment (the withholding from obligation funds 
that had been appropriated by the Congress) that all presidents before him had used.  
In addition, he had replaced the more technical Bureau of the Budget with a more 
powerful and less open Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Budgets were 
growing ever more complex, with off-budget financing schemes, and every year 
budgets contained more programs that effected the long term as much if not more than 
                                                 
1 OECD/World Bank, “Survey on Budget Practices and Procedures”, 2003.  See http:// 
oecd.dyndns.org. 
2 Much of the history of CBO is drawn from “Gourmet Chefs and Short Order Cooks: A Policy History 
of the Congressional Budget Office, 1975-2001”, unpublished manuscript by Dwayne Day, 2003. 
the short term. Moreover, for the first time in its history, the US had consistent 
peacetime deficits in a period of economic expansion.   So Congress, which did not 
have a budget process that considered the fiscal situation in aggregate, passed an 
extensive budget law in 1974.  President Nixon signed the new budget law just before 
he resigned.  This law took the powers of impoundment away from the president, 
created budget committees in the Senate and the House with powers to consider and 
control aggregate tax and spending levels, and authorized a new Congressional 
Budget Office to provide the new budget committees with roughly the same 
information that OMB provides to the president. Although the director of CBO is a 
political appointee selected by the Speaker of the House and the President pro 
tempore of the Senate for a four-year term (which may be repeated), the law 
authorizing CBO explicitly states that all of the employees of CBO are to be selected 
without respect to political affiliation. 
 
The law that created CBO provided only general guidance as to what its functions 
should be.  Although CBO now performs all of the functions listed above, it was not 
clear at its inception exactly what work it would do and what work the staff of the 
newly created budget committees would do.  In fact, a former CBO director who was 
present at CBO’s creation said that one view was to severely limit CBO’s role. 
 
    “What the House wanted [when CBO was created] was basically a manhole in 
which Congress would have a bill or something and it would lift up the 
manhole cover and put the bill down it, and 20 minutes later a piece of paper 
would be handed up, with the cost estimate, the answer, on it.  No visibility, 
[just] some kind of mechanism down below the ground level doing this ... non 
controversial [work], the way the sewer system [does].”3
 
CBO was able to expand its functions far beyond what was stated in this quote in 
large part because of the efforts it made from its inception to explicitly structure itself 
as a non-partisan, independent, objective analytic agency.  CBO currently has about 
235 staff to do all these functions, but it is relevant to review the distribution of CBO 
staff by “core” and “other” functions (see Table 1), as discussed above, and then 
compare this staffing with the staffing of core functions of two agencies (see Table 2) 
that provide information for “core” functions for the State of California (the 
Legislative Analyst’s Office {LAO}) and the City of New York (the Independent 
Budget Office {IPO}).4  Core functions at CBO and LAO require about 50 staff in 
each.  However, the size and complexity of the US and California budgets are so 
much greater than that of most other countries budgets that the 27 staff found in New 
York City’s IBO may provide a more appropriate comparison. 
 
Conclusions 
 
If legislatures are to play a substantive role in the budget formulation process, they 
will be well served by an independent source of budget information.  Examples in the 
Unites States and in a number of other countries establish that a non-partisan, 
                                                 
3 Robert Reischauer, as quoted in Nancy D. Kates, “Starting From Scratch: Alice Rivlin and the 
Congressional Budget Office (A),” Case Program, Kennedy School of Government, C16-88-872.0, 
1989, p. 3. 
4 See www.lao.ca.gov for information on California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office, and 
www.ibo.nyc.ny.us for information on New York City’s Independent Budget Office. 
independent, objective analytic unit can provide budget information without 
polarizing the relations between the executive and the legislature.  However, a 
requirement for the successful establishment of such a unit is the existence of, or the 
desire for, some kind of balance in the political environment—a balance between 
political factions and/or a balance between the executive and the legislature.  Once 
created, such a unit must operate in a credible and impartial manner if its value is to 
be sustained. 
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